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1 - Introduction 
 
Since the fall of the iron curtain 20 years ago the CEE region has continuously been 
through change, and has been the main source of substantial and above average 
growth for the Austrian financial service industry. Austrian bank and insurance 
companies started to enter the economies and managed to gain the leading position 
in most major countries of the CEE1, SEE2 and CIS3 region. They started off in the 
countries bordering Austria, which due to the close cultural and historical connection 
has proven to be a successful strategy. After this success their focus was moved 
further and further into the eastern part of the continent. 
1.1 – The Crisis 
In the fall of 2008 the situation in the financial world in Eastern Europe changed 
unfortunately. It started off with the write down of sub-prime mortgages in 2007, but 
the financial crisis officially swept over to Europe with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the bankruptcy of the banking system in Iceland. Since then exposure 
in the economies of Eastern Europe has been 
considered more risky. Many newspapers and rating 
agencies like the Wall Street Journal (Figure: “On the 
Hook”4), Business Week5 and Moody’s thought that the 
large exposure of Austrian banks and insurance 
companies in the region will result in higher risk and a 
possible downgrade in the rating. In November 2008 
the situation got worse, and the EU officially fell into a 
recession for the first time in its history. It was at this 
point that the first members of the Austrian banking 
sector started recognized their higher risk profile, and 
went to the State to get additional capital. The first one 
to take the bailout money from the state, was Erste 
Group. Raiffeisen Zentral Bank, the parent company of                                                         
1 Central and Eastern Europe 
2 South-Eastern Europe 
3 Conglomerate of Independent States (i.e. Ukraine) 
4 Wall Street Journal, Austria’s Vulnerable Eastern Flank, 11.3.2009, Christian Ortner 
5 Austria Pinched by Eastern Europe Woes, Business Week 12.3.2009, Rüdiger Falksohn and Walter 
Mayr 
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Raiffeisen International, later on also decided to apply for state capital. Even though 
UniCredit Bank Austria, was planning on taking money from bailout plans both in Italy 
and Austria, they will most likely divert from these plans. Bank Austria will not be able 
to receive money from the funds, since the parent company in Italy is planning to get 
fresh funds from the capital market, which restricts them from the bailout fund in 
Austria. Additionally they did not like the fact that the Austrian government only 
wanted to help if they received participation capital that later on could be converted 
into common stock, and therefore could take influence in the decision making 
process.6 
 
1.2 – Focus 
The focus of the thesis is to analyze one of the most difficult situations for Austrian 
financial institutions in their history, and conclude with an outlook on how the industry 
might adapt successfully. Since Austrian banks and insurance companies have taken 
a connecting role between western and eastern Europe, the thesis will focus on 
Austrian institutions that have their home market in the CEE and SEE and CIS 
region.  
 
Due to the large number of countries in the region, the thesis will focus on a set of 
countries that provide an overview of the mentioned sub-regions of Eastern Europe. 
On the other hand the selected countries also play a historic role for the institutions 
under review by this thesis. The CEE countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary) all have had a close historical connection to Austria over the past centuries, 
which is the reason why the Austrian financial institutions first developed in these 
markets after the UDSSR collapsed. Due to these factors it was not hard for them to 
understand the mentality and values of the market. The SEE region was the next 
step for the Austrian financial institutions. Austrian banks and insurance companies 
took a substantial stake of the Bulgarian and Romanian market, and therefore 
successfully exported their CEE knowledge to new markets. After they were present 
in all Eastern European markets that were either members of the European Union or 
had prospects to become one, they had to take the next step east towards the CIS 
region. Even though Russia is the biggest market of the region, it cannot only be                                                         
6 Bank Austria bleibt übrig; 24.9.2009; 
http://derstandard.at/fs/1253596392293/UniCredit-holt-sich-Kapital-vom-Markt-Bank-Austria-bleibt-
uebrig 
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considered European. For this reason, and the fact that Austrian institutions have a 
large stake in the banking and insurance system, the thesis will focus on the Ukraine.
The thesis focuses on the three biggest Austrian banks, and the two largest Austrian 
insurers of the region. The banks analyzed will be UniCredit Bank Austria, Raiffeisen 
International and Erste Group. These three banks are both the biggest7 banks in 
Austria, and have the most influence on the Eastern European market. The insurers 
analyzed are Vienna Insurance Group (VIG) and Uniqa, which are the biggest 
Austrian insurers, and have large influence in Eastern Europe.  
1.3 – Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The central research question of this thesis will be: 
How are the Austrian financial institutions going to adapt in the Eastern European 
market after the crisis? 
 
In order to answer this complex question several sub-questions will try to give an 
overall picture of the current risks and opportunities for the industry. The sub-
questions will be the following: 
• What influence will the large involvement in the Eastern European market 
have for the Austrian financial institutions? 
• How will their Equity have to adapt due to the crisis? 
• How influential are cost-cutting programs going to be on development and 
flexibility? 
• How will the strong market position of the Austrian financial institutions 
develop? 
• What role will financial regulation play in the future? 
 
These questions lead to the following hypotheses: 
H1: The large involvement of Austrian financial institutions in the Eastern European 
market bears substantial risks for the Austrian banking and insurance industry. 
H2: The countries of the region have enormous differences and therefore cannot be 
considered a homogeneous region. 
H3: The institutions will have trouble coming up with the necessary equity that will be 
demanded by the regulators, and therefore their room for expansion will be minimal.                                                         
7 Raiffeisen International considered as part of the Raiffeisen Network 
8 
H4: The current market position of Austrian financial institutions in the region will 
remain after the crisis. 
H5: Regulation will become a lot stricter and have a negative influence on growth. 
1.4 – Sources 
The historical side of this thesis has been well documented in the literature. Both the 
reformation process of the region after the fall of the iron curtain, and the integration 
into the European Union have been the topic of books, theses and other research 
papers. The financial crisis on the other hand has dominated the media for the past 
two years. Hence there is a lot of current literature about the topic, but a theoretical 
approach to the situation does not yet exist. For this reason most of the information in 
this thesis will be provided from business reports, national bank reports and other 
research papers from consulting agencies and investment banks rather than bound 
literature.  
1.5 – Structure 
At first the reader will be provided with an introduction into the thesis paper, and its 
goals. In the following chapter the focus will be on the historical development of the 
region, especially on its transformation process in the early 1990’s, since this process 
still poses problems to the current day. Additionally the second chapter covers 
perspectives of internationally renowned consultants and investment banks, and their 
general view of the current situation in Eastern Europe, but also specifically looking 
at the Austrian financial industry.  
 
Chapter three will focus on the state of the countries under review. It will give an 
overview of the general market situation, and the developments on the financial 
markets. The focus will be on the state of the financial markets specifically looking at 
the banking and insurance market.  
 
Chapter four will focus on the institutions under review. At first there will be a short 
overview of the Austrian banking market, followed by an analysis of the three 
Austrian banks under review. This analysis will cover their current situation, and then 
will focus on the individual divisions (Retail and Corporate), and on their subsidiaries 
in the region. Additionally there will be an overview of their strategy, and perhaps of 
adaptations that have become necessary due to the financial crisis. The second part 
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of the chapter will focus on the Austrian insurance industry. At first there will be a 
similar overview of the Austrian insurance market, and then the focus will shift to the 
divisions (life, non-life) before giving an overview of the subsidiaries in the countries 
under review.  
 
Chapter five will provide the empirical analysis for the hypotheses stated earlier. This 
was done via four open interviews with representatives of Austrian banks (Bank 
Austria, Raiffeisen International), and insurance companies (VIG, Uniqa). In order to 
give a balanced view of the situation that is not biased towards the perspective of 
private institutions an interview with a representative of the Austrian National Bank 
was also conducted. After providing a summary of the answers to the interview 
questions, an interpretation and conclusion of these answers will follow. The 
conclusions from these interviews will then provide the necessary information to 
answer the research questions. 
 
The final chapter will test the hypotheses due to the information provided by the 
empirical analysis in chapter five. Additionally there will be a summary of the current 
situation and an outlook on the future development of the industry within the Eastern 
European market. 
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2 - A Region of Change 
2.1 – CEE Conversion Process 
In 1989 the entire world was watching Europe and the reform process caused by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The system however was already changing since the 
1960’s due to the poorly articulated fiscal and financial structure of the communist 
system.8 The problem for the consumers was that they only had a limited choice of 
products, and that the high inflation ate up savings. When the government started to 
sell its properties, barely anyone had enough money to buy them.9 Additionally 
consumers only had limited choice on where to invest, for instance if somebody 
decided to get a life insurance it would not give them any advantage to depositing 
their income at a savings bank. This was the case because a life insurance company 
was only allowed to deposit the premiums with the monopolized savings bank. Hence 
there was not only a lack of choice for the consumers, but also for companies. For 
this reason people decided to invest in durable goods like houses and cars, which 
again where difficult to obtain due to strict rationing by the government. If bought, 
these goods would at least increase in value enough to compensate for inflation.10 
 
This left companies and consumers in a position contrary to any western economy. 
Due to a lack of competition, banks had an easy job. They were the only source of 
financing for the local companies. Additionally to the naturally high market share, 
they would simply give out loans if the formalities where met. It was not necessary to 
hold any kinds of reserves or have any type of risk assessment, since they could 
always rely on the government to bail them out. For this reason their portfolios where 
full of non-performing loans, and nobody had reason to believe that this was a 
problem.11 As a matter of fact there was no demand for financial information between 
                                                        
8 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 10 
9 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 11 
10 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg.  12 
11 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 13 
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the branches of the bank, causing a big problem for the banks once the communist 
system collapsed.12 
 
In late 1989 when most velvet revolutions occurred in the region, the system 
drastically changed due to the different views of the new leaders. Privatization was 
the keyword of the region, but it happened at different paces. Some governments like 
Romania decided to stick closer to the Soviet approach, while others like 
Czechoslovakia took a free market approach. At that point supranational institutions 
like the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction started to get involved to 
make sure that the officials of the region exercised fiscal and financial restraint.13 
This control mechanism was necessary, due to large declines in industrial output, 
which ultimately led to a widening public deficit.14 Several steps were taken to get 
these problems under control out of which the most vital one was a region-wide 
introduction of value added tax.15 
 
At this early stage of the conversion process consumers for the first time in over forty 
years were presented with a choice of which bank they wanted to invest their money 
in. The national banks began to retreat from their monopoly position as a commercial 
bank, and started to take the role of a regulator responsible for the monetary stability 
in the system.16 The government started to encourage the creation of private banks, 
but some communist thoughts still remained. The newly formed private banks, or 
more specifically their customers for example faced taxes on dividends, which where 
not common to any customer of a state-owned bank.17 
 
By 1992 the banks of the region started to feel the effects of the non-performing 
loans in their portfolios, which forced the governments to step in. They started to buy 
failing loan portfolios from banks that otherwise would have collapsed. However                                                         
12 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 14 
13 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 15 
14 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 17 
15 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 18 
16 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 20 
17 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 22 
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discrimination against private banks remained. Most of the aid was given to state 
owned banks if they had a low ratio of capital to assets. While trying to get rid of bad 
debt incurred during communist times, banks also had to start to offer new types of 
products covering the newly found risk appetite of consumers.18  
 
As a conclusion one can say that prior to the velvet revolutions of 1989 the region 
was unified, even though differences already existed before the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The reform process took different paths for different countries. Some 
governments where closer to Soviet ideology, while others had a more radical 
approach. In general it can be said that the more radical approach was also more 
successful, and that these advantages remain even 20 years later. Some countries 
developed quicker than others, but the privatization process gave entrepreneurs all 
over the region an incentive to make efficient decisions, or at least more efficient 
ones in the Soviet era.19 
2.2 – Government Position 
To completely understand the situation that CEE governments and the firms 
operating in these countries are in, one has to understand the general developments 
of the financial crisis and the government reactions that followed. According to a 
study conducted by Lazard, the financial service sector has recorded around 1 trillion 
US dollars in write-downs since the third quarter of 2007. In the proposition this was 
analyzed according to the region and sector where these write-downs took place, 
which is represented by the following figures.20 
 
       
       Figure 1      Figure 2                                                         
18 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 26 
19 The Development and Reform of Financial Sytems in Central and Eastern Europe, Bonin&Székely 
1994; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., England; pg. 31 
20 Government Position pg.1; Lazard Group, January 2009 
3 29 68 
Region 
Asia Europe Americas  74 15 
11  Sector  Banks/Brokers Insurers 
GSE 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Figure 1 shows that most of the write-downs until the end of 2008 occurred in the 
Americas region. This ultimately leads to the expectation that the European financial 
service industry will still have to write-down a substantial part of their assets. Figure 2 
shows that most of these write-downs occurred in the banking sector. This goes 
along with the common belief that the financial crisis is more of a bank than an 
insurance issue. 
 
These enormous write-downs also led to a large demand for capital by the 
institutions. According to the Lazard proposition, financial institutions raised an extra 
920 billion US dollars from the market since the third quarter of 2007. This was then 
analyzed according to the region and sector where these capital injections took 
place. 
           
    Figure 3                   Figure 4 
When comparing Figure 3 with Figure 1 it shows that even though there were more 
write-downs in the Americas, the European financial service industry has raised more 
capital comparatively. This might either be an indicator that the European financial 
service industry was not as well equipped with capital in comparison to their counter 
parts in the US, or that they are already expecting additional problems on the capital 
markets. Comparing Figure 4 to Figure 2 is yet another indicator that the crisis is a 
bigger issue for the banking sector. Another interesting fact about these capital raises 
is its source. Lazard states that during 2008, 40% of all capital raised by financial 
institutions came from government funds. The worrying trend is that during the last 
quarter of 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, this figure reached 67%. 
This might indicate that there is not enough capital available from investors to cover 
the needs of the financial institutions. When considering that most of this capital was 
6 
35 59 
Region 
Asia Europe Americas  86 
10  4 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Insurers 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raised in the US where there is a large market for equity one might ask how a 
relatively small European equity market could handle such issues.21 
 
These developments forced governments around the world to become active, since 
they were the only remaining source of capital for the industry.22 At first their actions 
considering  
• capital 
• funding, and 
• guarantees 
had to be quick, and did not leave them with a lot of time to analyze the possible 
effects of their actions. Their next step was, and still is to reconsider the make up of 
the entire industry. Some questions that are currently coming up are whether the 
world needs that many banks, and how the existing banks can further decrease their 
leverage without harming the recovery. Leverage in this context is the biggest issue. 
Most institutions after the booming years where highly levered in order to boost their 
profitability. However reversing this process has shown to be rather problematic. It 
leaves the industry in a vicious cycle. The falling confidence leads to higher 
perceived counterparty risk, which then leads to lower risk appetite and thereby 
reduced consumption, which then further reduces the confidence and so on. The 
outcome of this development can either be a mild, and perhaps healthy recession or 
a depression scenario. In a mild recession there would be a natural sorting out 
process, causing companies with poor business models to fail, but leaving good 
companies relatively stable. In a complete depression, banks that are well off could 
also fail, which would ultimately lead to the collapse of the financial system causing 
further problems like large unemployment figures and a collapse of asset prices.23 
The most important factor now is that governments and companies work closely 
together in order to ensure that the new policies created on factors like liquidity and 
capital do not harm a recovery.24 
2.3 – How long will the banking sector take to recover? 
According to renowned consulting agencies like the Boston Consulting Group the 
sector will take a long time to recover from these difficult times. According to                                                         
21 Government Position pg.2; Lazard Group, January 2009 
22 Government Position pg.7; Lazard Group, January 2009 
23 Government Position pg.6; Lazard Group, January 2009 
24 Government Position pg.7; Lazard Group, January 2009 
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estimates by the IMF, the losses in mature credit markets between 2007 and 2010 
where around 3.4 trillion US dollars, which is greater than any loss in world history. 
For this reason and due to new regulation banks will need fresh capital in order to 
survive these turbulences.25 Currently the governments of the world are giving out 
cheap credit in order to fulfill that need, but nobody is sure if that is going to be 
enough to get out of this dilemma. Another suggestion would be direct action as for 
example direct capital injections. However these actions are often feared by the 
government officials, since it would transfer taxpayer money to the share- and 
bondholders of these failing institutions, which would not be welcomed by the public 
during a future election.26 Another problem is that a lot of banks in the US and 
Europe are currently holding onto their assets, because realizing their losses would 
cause them to go bankrupt. This is worrying, since such banks do not give out new 
loans and therefore do not get the world economy going again. They mention that 
this is very critical in Europe, since European banks have not written down their 
assets to the same extent as their US counter parts.27 Another indicator that 
European banks are going to give out less loans in the future, are the beliefs of the 
European Commission that in order for banks to receive state aid, these will have to 
shrink their balance sheets. Currently due to the cheap money available to banks 
from the market profits are rising once again, but the profitability of the sector will still 
be under pressure for years to come.28 
 
Another disturbing development for economic growth is the protectionist approach of 
governments. Since the 1980’s there was a trend towards deregulation in the 
financial sector, but due to the crisis this has been reversed. In 2009 the G-20 
nations agreed to become active again in order to protect their national economic 
interests, and to prevent another financial crisis from happening.29 However the 
resources of these governments to stimulate the economy are also limited, especially 
considering some economies that already prior to the financial crisis had high debt 
levels. Since capital markets are expecting them to balance their budgets this could 
cause additional difficulties that might push the world back into a recession. 
                                                        
25 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 12 
26 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 13 
27 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 17 
28 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 18 
29 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 37 
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Unfortunately for some the only possibility will be to cut spending, increase taxes and 
perhaps seek inflation as a last resort.30 
 
One problem for the European banking system is the increase in the regulation for 
the financial service industry, specifically those companies involved in cross-border 
business. Many governments are currently pressuring these banks to stop lending 
outside their home market. When taking into account the situation of most CEE 
countries, where most of the banks are in the hands of foreigners this trend becomes 
critical. If these “foreign” banks decrease their lending, it might result in another crisis 
that according to them might be bigger than the Asian crisis towards the end of the 
90’s.31 Despite the fact that academics agree that protectionism generates less 
wealth than free trade, the governments of Europe currently have different 
priorities.32 Their goal seems to be to have more control over the financial system, 
which they are trying to achieve through government ownership and more regulation. 
Unfortunately from a historical point of view, government ownership has not proven 
to be successful or efficient. It seems unlikely that the governments will step back out 
of these equity positions once things start going again. Their efforts will be to protect 
their financial network from foreigners, and through more regulation reduce the high 
leverage ratios amongst the financial institutions, and constrain the return of 
speculative investors.33 However a unified set of regulations, which would be 
beneficiary to the system seems unlikely, since some countries with a strong financial 
service industry are not interested in restraining growth in that segment. 
Unfortunately this additional regulation, which will be different from country to 
country, will most likely hinder growth prospects.34 
 
In the future the world for the financial service industry will be more difficult. One 
thing that cannot be expected in the near future is a return to the pre-crisis profit 
levels. Their environment will be less growth friendly. They will have to face lower 
economic growth as well as stricter regulation from protectionist governments. 
Additionally in the future companies will only be considered good if they have solid 
balance sheets, which indicate that increasing leverage to increase profitability will                                                         
30 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 39 
31 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 47 
32 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 49 
33 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 50 
34 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 51 
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not be likely in the future.35 However such a recession is not only negative. Within 
often lies the opportunity of a lifetime for some companies.36 Now is the time where a 
successful business model pays off, and those without one will ultimately exit the 
market.37 In a new low-growth environment the acquisition of weaker competitors, will 
be an important source of growth for many industries.38 It will be important to focus 
on core competencies, and perhaps let go of other parts in the portfolio that are not 
essential.39 
2.4 – Insurance Industry 
The European insurance industry despite that it had a smaller amount of write-downs 
than the banking sector, developed similarly in its share price. However analysts from 
Deutsche Bank believe that even though the financial turmoil caused both balance 
sheet and expected earnings levels to erode, the majority of insurance companies 
still look well capitalized. For this reason new equity issuance still seems unlikely, but 
with the current volatility of the markets this could change quickly. They believe that 
this also poses the largest risk for the sector. Since insurance companies are 
exposed to the developments on the financial markets, another downturn in 
economic activity could also make stronger capital measures necessary.40 
 
In terms of solvency their outlook for the insurance sector depends on which 
segment an insurance company is covering. The non-life insurers in the market seem 
to be robustly capitalized, while life insurers are relatively worse off. In general they 
believe that companies, which have historically shown to be sensitive to capital 
markets have hedged their position such that further downward movements should 
not have an effect. The main risk for the solvency ratios now lies with the 
development of the corporate bond market as the financial crisis has started to affect 
the real economy.41  
 
                                                        
35 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 59 
36 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 61 
37 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 63 
38 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 65 
39 Accelerating out of the Great Recession; David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, 2010 BCG, USA, pg. 134 
40 European Insurers: The Morning After – Earnings and target prices revised pg.1; Deutsche Bank 
Global Markets Research, 14.10.2009; Oliver Steel, Spencer Horgan, Paolo Tamagnini 
41 European Insurers: The Morning After – Earnings and target prices revised pg.3; Deutsche Bank 
Global Markets Research, 14.10.2009; Oliver Steel, Spencer Horgan, Paolo Tamagnini 
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According to analysts from Bank of America, stock prices of the insurance sector 
have come under significant pressure following the difficulties towards the end of 
2008. However they believe that insurance companies with a focus on the CEE 
region have not lost their relative valuation premium, despite the fact that the GDP 
growth gap in comparison to Western Europe is not as big as it used to be.42 Similar 
to the Deutsche Bank analysts they have also seen a large deterioration of the 
solvency ratios, but they believe that the insurance sector has comparatively gotten 
better through the crisis than the banking counterpart.43 One problematic issue, 
considering the new regulation that will most likely increase the equity requirements, 
is the fact that most European insurance companies have considerably increased 
their leverage ratios since 2004. With continuous troubles on the financial markets 
this might still put additional pressure on their solvency ratios.44 
 
                                                        
42 European Insurance Sector – A Review: Merrill Lynch pg. 3; 20.4.2009 
43 European Insurance Sector – A Review: Merrill Lynch pg. 4; 20.4.2009 
44 European Insurance Sector – A Review: Merrill Lynch pg. 5; 20.4.2009 
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3 - Countries 
 
This section will be an overview of the developments in the individual countries 
covered by this thesis. At first there will be an overview of the general 
macroeconomic environment in order to be able to provide an insight into the current 
situation of each country. The differences between the countries are very important, 
since even though they are more or less considered as part of one region, all of them 
are at different stages in their development. 
 
Figure 145 
Additionally each one felt different effects from the crisis. While countries like the 
Czech Republic have been able to remain at a good level in comparison to pre-crisis 
values, other countries like Hungary have been heavily hit. From Figure 1, one can 
tell Erste Group’s opinion on the development of the economies. The countries in this 
graph are separated into three sections (Emerging, Developing, Mature) depending 
on their GDP per capita, their Banking Assets to GDP ratio and the stage in their 
development. The main point to focus on from this figure is that most of the countries 
closely around Austria are already classified as developing countries. These 
countries are also showing demand for more complicated banking products such as 
mortgages and credit cards, while the Ukraine, which is still an emerging economy, is 
mainly driven by products like debit cards and current accounts. At this early stage 
the market basically still has to be “conquered”. Due to differences like this, it is                                                         
45 Erste Bank Annual Report 2008, pg. 27 
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while the new group board can focus on strategy and exert equal 
attention to the performance of all businesses. This creates the 
basis for stable growth and further synergies in the future. 
 
Another efficiency aspect that came to the forefront in 2008 was 
the efficient management of capital resources. In light of the 
deepening financial crisis and mounting losses at many West 
European and US banks investors demanded higher capital ratios 
from all banks. As collapsing share prices made it difficult for 
most banks to issue equity at reasonable terms or in sufficient 
amounts, governments across the globe stepped in offering to 
purchase core capital eligible securities as a medium term solu-
tion. In order to maintain a level competitive playing field the 
Austrian government also launched a banking package valued at 
EUR 100 billion, comprising EUR 15 billion of capital infusions, 
EUR 75 billion in state guarantees in order to ensure continued 
access to liquidity, and EUR 10 billion in additional deposit 
insurance coverage. While we posted our best ever tier 1 ratio in 
2008 – at 7.2% – prudence required us to take up the measures 
offered by the government. Accordingly, we have entered into 
agreements setting out the issuance of up to EUR 6 billion in state 
guaranteed bonds in order to further bolster an otherwise solid 
liquidity position, and the issuance of up to EUR 2.7 billion in 
core tier 1 eligible participation capital, in order to further 
strengthen our capital base. 
 
 
LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT DRIVERS 
While business growth will clearly not be a topic for the immedi-
ate or possibly even the medium-term future as a result of the 
weakening global economic fundamentals, we will still briefly 
present the long-term development patterns in our markets, as 
well as the three most important determinants of our long-term 
growth: retail business, wealth management and the continued 
business development within our existing CEE markets. 
 
Development patterns  
Our business model benefits from a long-term growth profile that 
extends over the next 15 – 20 years and is tied to the economic 
catch-up process of Central and Eastern Europe. While this proc-
ess is characterised by phases of faster growth as well as re-
trenchment periods, the underlying trend is cl arly pointing to-
wards a long-term, sustainable growth path. Our business model 
derives its strength from the fact that our markets are at different 
stages of development. For this purpose, we have classified our 
markets into three clusters: emerging, developing and mature 
markets. 
 
Emerging markets are characterised by a GDP/capita l vel of 
below EUR 5,000 and a banking asset penetration of some 60% 
or less; for classification purposes we use only GDP/capita as 
financial intermediation measures can temporarily show inconsis-
tencies as a result of unsustainable growth bursts. Depending on 
the economic position at the start of transformation, we estimate 
this period to take between 5 – 20 years. Within our business 
portfolio Erste Bank Serbia and Erste Bank Ukraine, our Serbia  
and Ukrainian subsidiaries respectively, operate in such markets. 
At this stage of development growth is mostly derived from 
plain-vanilla banking products, such as savings and payments 
transfers as well as current accounts and debit cards. While 
household loans usually play an insignificant role at these levels 
of income, an increase in the banked population is typically a 
major source of growth. 
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Source: Local central banks, Erste Group. 
 
Developing markets feature GDP/capita between EUR 5,000 and 
EUR 20,000 and a banking asset penetration ratio of anywhere 
between 60% and 140%. We estimate that this stage lasts at least 
15 – 20 years. In this period retail lending comes of age and 
transformation countries reach a level of wealth that facilitates 
the introduction of more sophisticated banking products, such as 
mortgages, credit cards and consumer loans as well as wealth 
management products. Our central European businesses in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and Romania fall 
into this bracket. 
 
Mature markets are defined by GDP/capita in excess of EUR 
20,000 and banking asset penet ation north of 150%. These tend 
to offer only selected growth opportunities and typically only 
grow in line with GDP. We find it useful to operate in such mar-
kets to the extent that we can draw on experiences and transfer 
knowledge to less developed markets. Depending on the factors 
that influence market structure, the most significant of which is 
shareholder orientation or the lack thereof, these markets can 
either be very profitable such as in the UK or Spain, or les  so, 
such as in Austria or Germany. 
 
Retail business growth 
In many of the countries in which we operate, modern retail 
banking services except for deposits were non-existent just a 
couple of years ago. On the lending side, this was firstly because 
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important to differentiate between the countries, since some are closer to western 
economies while others still have a long way ahead of them. 
 
The second part of the country analysis will focus on the stability of the financial 
sector. The combination of the real economic situation, and the stability of the 
financial system will provide an overview of the situation that Austrian financial 
institutions are currently facing.  
3.1 – Czech Republic 
The country has not been hit hard by the economic crisis in 2008, but never the less 
it is facing the effects ever since. For this reason the analysts of the Czech National 
Bank (CNB) expect a negative development of the GDP for 2009, while they 
estimated a slight recovery for 2010.46 However all of these estimates remain very 
vague, since no one is able to foresee the effects the crisis will still have. In total it 
has to be mentioned that in comparison to other countries of the region, the Czech 
Republic is considered as stable and well off.   
 
The officials, similarly to a lot of governments in the western world, have been trying 
to conquer the problems of decreasing economic activity through lowering the 
interest rate.47 They believe that the real interest rates, especially in the corporate 
sector are still to high to foster growth.48 However these adaptations in monetary 
policy are not the ultimate solution, since there are several other risks not under the 
influence of the Czech government as for instance the value of the currency. Another 
factor that has a negative impact on a possible recovery is the deterioration of the 
creditworthiness of non-financial corporations (see Figure 1) and the increase in 
bankruptcies.49 Additionally there is also rising credit risk in the household sector. If 
there was a 10% decrease in nominal income a lot of households would not be able 
to manage to repay their debt.50 A lot of this debt has been issued to finance houses, 
which became the collateral for these loans, which again results in a decrease of 
property prices and thereby makes these issues even more critical for banks. 
                                                        
46 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 18 
47 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 19 
48 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 20 
49 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 26 
50 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 31 
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Figure 151 
The financial sector performed well in 2008, and managed to maintain its 
comparatively high profitability levels. As one of the few countries in the OECD, the 
Czech Republic was not induced to increase the solvency level in their banking 
sector, but rather increase the deposit insurance limit, which was similar to most 
Western-European economies.52 Hence the banking sector remains in a very good 
position, but there has been a major effect on the behavior of these players. 
Nowadays customers have to face tougher credit standards than a couple of years 
ago, but this development seems completely adequate. After all the Czech banking 
sector cannot pull itself out of the international connections with the banking industry. 
The insurance sector was hit harder, and had to face losses due to the devaluation of 
toxic assets in their portfolios.53 
 
The banking sector only suffered small losses from the revaluation of toxic assets. 
Their net profit decreased by 3%, to 45.7 billion CZK in comparison to 2007. By the 
end of 2008 it became clear that some countries in the CEE region are going to need 
external financing, and are going to have problems covering the foreign loans in the 
economies. The Czech Republic however only has a small share of foreign loans, 
and generally banks are independent of external financing. It seems strange that a 
country where a lot of banks are in the hands of foreign investors is independent of 
external financing, but in this case it is easily explained. Due to the low loan to 
deposit ratio in their portfolios, Czech banks are basically financed from primary 
deposits (see Figure 2). The loans in foreign currencies can basically be neglected 
(see Figure 3).  In comparison to other countries of the region, this strategy has 
                                                        
51 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 26 
52 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 48 
53 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 49 
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2008 H2 saw a marked increase in the corporate sector’s credit risk as measured 
by the 12-month default rate on bank loans to corporates, as a consequence of 
the falling external demand (see Chart II.19). At the start of 2007 this indicator 
had been moving around 3%, but at the end of 2008 it exceeded 7% and in 
2009 Q1 it reached about 7.5%.7 According to an internal CNB model, it should 
rise further in 2009 to 11% or even to 13% in the event of signifi cantly adverse 
developments (see alternative scenario C in section 4.1.1).8 The increase in the NPL 
ratio is refl ected in deteriorating loan portfolios of banks.9 The ratio of NPLs to 
total loans has been increasing since 2008 H2 (see section 4.1). 
The decline in external demand had particularly a negative effect on export-
oriented fi rms, which form the backbone of the Czech economy (see Box 2). 
This is illustrated by pronounced growth in the 12-month bank loan default rate 
among the largest exporters (see Chart II.20). Unlike in previous years10, however, 
the default rate is also deteriorating among exporters with euro-denominated 
debts. This may also be partly due to the exchange rate depreciation in 2008 Q4.
The rising corporate sector risk is confi rmed by the creditworthiness indicator, 
one of the forward-looking indicators of corporate sector stability.11 Based on 
the aggregated fi nancial results of non-fi nancial corporations, this indicator 
assesses the corporate sector’s overall fi nancial condition, or the resilience of 
fi rms to default in the next year. It is calculated using seven fi nancial indicators 
covering fi rms’ profi tability, liquidity, indebtedness and activity. The fi gures 
obtained show that the corporate sector’s creditworthiness deteriorated further 
in 2008, although it was still better than in 2005 (see Chart II.21). The risk level 
of corporations was adversely affected by worsening profi tability, a modest rise 
in debt and deteriorating activity. By contrast, the decline in creditworthiness was 
moderated by a rise in fi rms’ balance-sheet liquidity.
The increased risk of default is confi rmed by the number of insolvency petitions 
fi led,12 which increased by 6% year on year. Compared to 2007, however, 
the rate of growth of insolvency petitions increased by only 0.5 percentage point 
7 The 12-month default rate is calculated as the ratio between the volume of bank loans 30–89 days 
past due and average total outstanding loans in the 12-month period after the reference period. 
The calculation method implies that this indicator can only be accurate if one has information about 
the developments in the 12-month period after the reference period. As such information was not 
available in full when the calculations for the last year were made, an estimate is made for the last 11 
months assuming a trend based on the average for the data already available. The calculations are based 
on data from the CNB-administered Central Credit Register, which contains data on the bank loans of 
legal entities. 
8 A detailed description of the model applied can be found in Jakubík, P., Schmieder, C. (2008): Stress 
Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany? CNB WP 9/2008.
9 The forward-looking nature of the default rate means that loan portfolios would  deteriorate substantially 
in 2010.
10 See Box 2 Analysis of export-oriented corporations in Financial Stability Report 2007, pp. 25–26, or 
Geršl, A.: Co ničí české exportéry? [What is Destroying Czech Exporters?] Euro, No. 35, 25 August 
2008. 
11 For more details about this indicator, see Jakubík, P. (2008): Scoring as an Indicator of Financial Stability, 
Financial Stability Report 2007, Czech National Bank, pp. 76–85.
12 All data on the number of insolvencies are from Creditreform statistics. For “insolvency petition” we will 
henceforth use the shortened term “insolvency”.
 CHART II.20
Fall in net exports and rise in 12M default rate of 
export-oriented corporations
(%; data for 1,000 largest exporters)
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 CHART II.21
Indicator of creditworthiness of non-financial corporations
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 CHART II.23
Credit growth  
(monthly data; year-on-year growth in credit to corporations by number of employees in %)
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 CHART II.22
Number of bankruptcy petitions filed
(annual data)
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proven to be a very successful. It limits the dependence on factors not under the 
control of the host country. 54 
  
Figure 255      Figure 356  
The amounts of loans outstanding draw another awkward picture. Despite the fact 
that most European economies are facing lower demand for loans, the Czech 
Republic still has relatively high growth rates (16.4% at the end of 2008). However it 
can be expected that this demand for new loans is going to depreciate. First of all 
due to the increasing non-performing loans ratio (NPL) (3.8% in Q12009, in 
comparison to 3.1% in Q42008), the interest rates paid by borrowers are also going 
to increase, since it has to be expected that more borrowers default in their 
payments.  Another reason is that the banks operating in the Czech Republic are 
going to tighten their non-interest regulations, as for example increasing the amount 
of collateral requested to secure a loan.57 All together it can be concluded that Czech 
banks are well off, since they are liquid with a Tier 1 capital ratio well over 10%, and 
are merely facing a situation of declining profitability due to the increase in non-
performing loans.58 
 
The insurance sector in contrast was facing more difficult times during 2008. Their 
growth rate of premiums written decreased from 8.9% to 5.2% in comparison to 
2007, which was largely caused by the decline in growth of the life insurance 
segment (see Figure 4). However the equity-linked life insurance, in comparison to 
other declines in the EU has not been the main reason with a growth rate of 17.4 % 
in 2008.  Unfortunately for the insurance sector the claim settlement costs have gone                                                         
54 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 50 
55 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 50 
56 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 50 
57 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 52 
58 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 54 
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and a high percentage of foreign currency loans in some economies, which, in 
conjunction with low economic growth, would result in a marked increase in non-
performing loans in some CEE economies. The possibility of this adverse scenario 
arising was also refl ected in share prices and prices of CDS contracts of bank 
groups with major exposures to CEE countries (see section 3.1). 
Although the Czech Republic is one of the new EU Member States from the CEE 
region, it is already classifi ed by international institutions and many global 
investment banks as an advanced economy and no longer as an emerging 
economy, as it does not share some of the economic and fi nancial features of 
most new EU Member States.62
The Czech Republic and Slovenia are the only new CEE EU Member States where 
the banking sector is independent of external funding, despite a high share of 
foreign ownership of domestic banks. This is confi rmed by the positive net external 
position of the banking sector (see Chart IV.4). The major Czech banks are thus often 
et creditors of the European b nk groups of which they are members. Although 
domestic banks borrow abroad (see Chart IV.5), these external borrowings are 
relatively small compared to those of the other countries of the region and EU 
countries. The refi nancing risk is also low in the Czech Republic, since the short-
term net external position of the banking sector is positive and banks would be 
thus able to cover any shortfalls in external short-term fi nancing by liquidating 
short-term external claims. 
The independence of the Czech banking sector of external funding is due to 
the high deposit-to-loan ratio, which is high even by European standards (see 
Chart IV.6). Credit expansion is thus fi nanced mainly from primary deposits. 
The remaining liquidity is withdrawn by the central bank in regular repo operations 
(see section 3.1). The excess of deposits over loans also fosters good balance-
sheet liquidity of domestic banks.
A very low share of foreign currency loans is another strong point of the Czech 
banking system and one of the reasons why the Czech Republic avoided 
the liquidity problems seen in advanced markets in 2008 Q4 (see Chart IV.7). 
This share is virtually zero for loans to households and stood at around 18% 
for non-fi nancial corporations at the end of 2008. This conservative strategy of 
households and corporations borrowing in the domestic currency signifi cantly limits 
the dependence of banks on developments in the interbank euro or Swiss franc 
markets and reduces the sensitivity of debtors to depreciation of the exchange 
rate and changes in the interest rate environment in creditors’ countries. 
62 GDP per capita in the Czech Republic expressed in purchasing power parity slightly exceeds 80% of 
the EU-27 average, which is higher than that in Portugal, for example. The World Bank and the IMF 
include the Czech Republic in the advanced countries group. 
 CHART IV.6
Source: ECB
Note: EA = euro area; EU = average for all EU countries.
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and a high percentage of foreign currency loans in some economies, which, in 
conjunction with low economic growth, would result in a marked increase in non-
performing loans in some CEE economies. The possibility of this adverse scenario 
arising was also refl ected in share prices and prices of CDS contracts of bank 
groups with major exposures to CEE countries (see section 3.1). 
Although the Czech Republic is one of the new EU Member States from the CEE 
region, it is already classifi ed by international institutions and many global 
investment banks as an advanced economy and no longer as an emerging 
economy, as it does not share some of the economic and fi nancial features of 
most new EU Member States.62
The Czech Republic and Slovenia are the only new CEE EU Member States where 
the banking sector is independent of external funding, despite a high share of 
foreign ownership of domestic banks. This is confi rmed by the positive net external 
position of the banking sector (see Chart IV.4). The major Czech banks are thus often 
net creditors of the European bank groups of which they are members. Although 
domestic banks borrow abroad (see Chart IV.5), these external borrowings are 
relatively small compared to those of the other countries of the region and EU 
countries. The refi nancing risk is also low in the Czech Republic, since the short-
term net external position of the banking sector is positive and banks would be 
thus able to cover any shortfalls in external short-term fi nancing by liquidating 
short-term external claims. 
The independence of the Czech banking sector of external funding is due to 
the high deposit-to-loan ratio, which is high even by European standards (see 
Chart IV.6). Credit expansion is thus fi nanced mainly from primary deposits. 
The remaining liquidity is withdrawn by the central bank in regular repo operations 
(see section 3.1). The excess of deposits over loans also fosters good balance-
sheet liquidity of domestic banks.
A very low share of foreign currency loans is another strong point of the Czech 
banking system and one of the reasons why the Czech Republic avoided 
the liquidity problems seen in advanced markets in 2008 Q4 (see Chart IV.7). 
This share is virtually zero for loans to households and stood at around 18% 
for non-fi nancial corporations at the end of 2008. This conservative strategy of 
households and corporations borrowing in the domestic currency signifi cantly limits 
the dependence of banks on developments in the interbank euro or Swiss franc 
markets and reduces the sensitivity of debtors to depreciation of the exchange 
rate and changes in the interest rate environment in creditors’ countries. 
62 GDP p  c p ta in he Czech Republic expressed in purchasing power parity slightly exceeds 80% of 
the EU-27 average, which is higher than that in Portugal, for example. The World Bank and the IMF 
include the Czech Republic in the advanced countries group. 
 CHART IV.6
Source: ECB
Note: EA = euro area; EU = average for all EU countries.
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up due to terminations and settlements of contracts. This might indicate a decrease 
in the demand for life insurance products.59 For 2009 the Czech insurance industry is 
looking at lower premium growth rates due to the decline in demand for products like 
life-, motor-vehicle- and industrial insurance. This effect is worsened by having to 
face higher costs in claim settlement, and higher capital requirements according to 
Solvency 2. Never the less, all insurance companies operating in the Czech Republic 
remain well-capitalized despite the fact that the average solvency ratio declined from 
335% to 235% in 2008.60 
 
 
Figure 461 
3.2 – Hungary 
Out of the EU countries covered in this thesis Hungary was perhaps one of the most 
severely hit by the effects of the financial crisis. This was to a certain degree caused 
by the very negative sentiment that investors showed towards the economy. They 
viewed the country as being in too much external debt, and in combination with the 
lower risk appetite caused by the financial crisis, the country was perhaps doomed 
more by the international community than necessary. The external debt actually is a 
very big issue that needs to be addressed by the government, but this is no different 
to many other countries of the EU. The only problem is that the level of external debt 
was already very high prior to the crisis, and therefore will always look large in a 
regional comparison (see Figure 1). 
                                                        
59 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 56 
60 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 57 
61 CNB Financial Stability Report 2008-2009, pg. 56 
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Building society loans represent almost 40% of all housing loans. At 27%, they 
grew more rapidly in 2008 than loans provided by the banking sector as a whole 
(20%). The growth in building society loans was due mostly to bridging loans, 
which to a certain extent are an alternative to bank mortgage loans. Their share in 
total building society loans was 80% at the end of 2008 (see Chart IV.23). Housing 
loans provided by building societies are characterised by very conservative LTV 
ratios, which averaged roughly 35% at the end of 2008.
4.1.2  Non-banking fi nancial institutions
Insurance companies
The economic and asset market developments were also refl ected in the insurance 
companies sector. The growth rate of premiums written moderated from 8.9% 
in 2007 to 5.2% in 2008, owing chiefl y to a decline in the growth rate of life 
insurance from almost 15% in 2007 to around 5% in 2008 (see Chart IV.24). By 
contrast, investment life insurance recorded buoyant growth in premiums written 
(17.4%), unlike in the euro area, where this segment experienced lower demand 
as a result of the adverse fi nancial market developments.74 The high growth 
in investment life insurance in the Czech Republic was probably infl uenced by 
the fact that the fi nancial market crisis in Central Europe and the resulting impact 
on investment life insurance returns did not fully emerge until the end of 2008. 
The insurance sector recorded higher claim settlement costs in 2008, especially in 
the life insurance segment, which saw a rise of almost 22% (see Chart IV.25). This 
is related to a higher number of terminated and settled contracts. Some of these 
terminated contracts might indicate a gradual decrease in demand for investment 
life insurance, including a higher degree of cancellation of existing contracts, amid 
expectations of an economic downturn and weaker investment returns. 
Return on equity decreased to 14% (from 21.7% in 2007) and average return 
on assets fell to 2.7% (from 3.7% in 2007). The lower profi tability compared 
to 2007 can be attributed to asset revaluation losses. Insurance companies 
invest their technical provisions set aside for future claim settlements primarily 
in government bonds and bonds issued by banks and international institutions 
(53% of technical provisions at the end of 2008). Other investments were made 
in corporate and municipal bonds, mortgage bonds, mutual fund units, property 
and marketable shares (see Chart IV.26). The adverse developments on the fi nancial 
markets affected virtually all types of investment, including many of the bonds in 
which insurance companies invest. 
Insurance companies can be regarded as well capitalised, since in 2007 they were 
again comfortably compliant with the solvency criteria, i.e. they had internal funds 
greater than or equal to the required solvency ratio. The aggregate available 
margin was 2.7 times the required solvency margin on the life insurance market 
and 3.3 times that on the non-life insurance market.75
74 See the ECB Financial Stability Review, June 2009. 
75 Data for 2008 will become available in July 2009.
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Source:  CNB, MF CR
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Figure 162 
Another reason why Hungary is having problems was the low growth rate of the GDP 
during the booming years. Fortunately when the crisis unfolded the country was 
saved by external aid provided by organizations like the IMF. The credit line of twenty 
billion Euros that was given to Hungary significantly lowered the perception that it 
was going to have difficulties refinancing its external debt.  Additional help came from 
parent companies, providing their Hungarian subsidiaries with sufficient liquidity to 
withstand the consequences of the crisis. Parent companies have become essential 
to the Hungarian banking sector, since without their assistance many subsidiaries 
would have faced liquidation during the last quarter 2008. Many risks unfortunately 
remain in the region, which is reflected by the increase in risk premium of all CEE 
nations.63 
 
The deteriorating European macroeconomic environment also had a significant effect 
on the Hungarian economy. The country faced deteriorating exports, while the 
domestic demand was unable to compensate these issues.64 The decline in demand 
of households stems from the difficulties of the corporate sector to maintain its 
profitability. Despite these issues, the decline in external demand is a much larger 
                                                        
62 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 25 
63 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 19 
64 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 22 
Government debt and net external debt indicators are
at high levels both historically and in regional
comparison. For Hungary, both the net external debt and
gross government debt
15
– the latter of which also indicates
the country’s compliance with the Maastricht criterion – have
grown in recent years as a proportion of GDP. By the end of
2008, government debt and net external debt had risen to 73
per cent and more than 52 per cent of GDP, respectively (see
Box 1-2 for details on external debt indicators). These debt
ratios are considered high both in regional and in
international comparison (see Chart 1-11).
Risks arising from the high ratio of external debt may
be mitigated by a number of factors. The rapid increase
in banks’ external funds played a key role in the growth of
the debt ratio. In 2008 nearly 50 per cent of total net external
debt was related to the sector of credit institutions. At the
same time, more than half of domestic banks’ external
financing is comprised of parent bank funds. Recent
experiences indicate that, in the period of unfavourable
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Chart 1-11
Net external debt and gross government debt as a
proportion of GDP 
(as of 31 December 2007)
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may be more expedient to monitor net debt indicators, which deduct
the value of assets.13 Hungary’s net debt indicators show a considerably
more favourable picture than the gross values, which disregard the
assets of the country.
In international comparative analyses, the handling of off-shore-type
companies which are resident in legal terms but have a loose
relationship with the national economy may present a further
problem. Based on international methodological recommendations,
the data of the so-called special purpose enterprises (SPEs) should be
stated in gross terms, which, in turn, may significantly distort official
statistics. The underlying reason is that these entities usually settle in
a given country only to exploit tax benefits. By means of the funds
flowing through them they only play an intermediate role within the
group of companies, rather than being actual targets of direct
investments. In Hungary, for the sake of economically established
analysis, external debt statistics are also compiled without these
companies. However, for the time being, in the databases of
international organisations (e.g. Eurostat) statistics covering the
complete range of companies are available, in accordance with
methodological standards.14
Based on the above considerations, the MNB’s analyses are based on the
balance of payments excluding the SPEs, and in terms of external
vulnerability they focus on debt indicators without intercompany loans
and financial derivatives (Table 1-4).
13 This phenomenon is also contributed to by the fact that multinational companies and banking groups often provide funding to group member operating in a third
country through a subsidiary resident in an intermediary country. In this case the mediating country’s debt-type liabilities and assets also increase, while the net
external debt remains unchanged.
14 Just like Hungary, some other countries (e.g. Luxembourg) also publish their balances of payments which exclude the special purpose enterprises. Steps have been
taken in international statistical rule-making to make the reporting of both balances of payments to international organisations possible in the future.
15 In our analysis, net external debt excludes intercompany loans and financial derivative liabilities.
Gross Net
Excluding SPEs
Including intercompany loans 105,3 50,5
Excluding intercompany loans 85,1 47,6
Note: Excluding financial derivatives.
Source: MNB.
Table 1-4
Hungary’s external debt indicators as a proportion of GDP
(end-2008 Q3 data, per cent)
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threat to the economy. A delayed global recovery therefore would cause larger 
problems for the government than the decrease in domestic demand.65 
 
Credit risk as with most other countries in the region poses a significant risk to the 
banking sector. Banks are facing decreasing growth in their portfolios (see Figure 2), 
which is mainly caused by the decrease in risk appetite, and on the other hand their 
portfolio quality seems to be continuously decreasing. This development is very 
harmful to the economy, since banks in these difficult times are seeking deposits, 
and since corporations are unable to finance their investments through lending they 
have to rely on their deposits.66 Another possible threat is the Hungarian Forint, 
which has shown to be very volatile in difficult times. This left credit institutions with 
enormous foreign currency positions. All of these additional risks led to a tightening 
of credit standards, and a reduction in the supply of loans specifically for short-term 
loans.67  
 
One country specific problem of Hungary is the large debt of firms in Swiss Francs. 
This makes up approximately 30% of all FX positions held by corporations even if 
some of them are not even exporting products to Switzerland. These small firms 
have the highest exposure in this risk, and unfortunately in most cases are not 
hedged against it.68 
 
Figure 269                                                         
65 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 23 
66 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 30 
67 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 31 
68 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 34 
69 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 32 
Availability of trade credit may also decline. Certain
sectors are overly reliant on external financing or have high
short-term leverage: for instance, over 50 per cent of bank loans
to commercial enterprises and food industry are short-term
loans (see Chart 2-5). As a result, these sectors are hit by not
only the general drop in demand, but also by the increasingly
limited availability of new funds. Simultaneously, alternative
sources of financing are also becoming difficult to access:
deterioration in the general liquidity position of market
participants prevents firms from refinancing their bank credit
with commercial loans. In fact, in sectors such as trade,
construction and the machinery industry, where the proportion
of trade credit is already very high, reliance on bank loans will
likely increase further due to the liquidity problems faced by
contractual partners. As for lternative sour es of fin nc ng,
large firms with foreign parent companies can borrow abroad
or receive working capital credit. In contrast, smaller companies
can only draw on the refinancing facilities provided by the
government or EU-based refinancing schemes.
Lending standards are tightening. The previous lending
surveys conducted by the MNB show that banks have been
tightening their lending conditions since early 2008 and
based on their stronger bargaining position due to a general
shortage of funds, have successfully been able to pass the
increased cost of funding on to their corporate customers.
Accordingly, average corporate interest premia have nearly
doubled over the past 6 months. In the meantime the
benchmark HUF interest rate (BUBOR) has also increased
and as a result corporate HUF loans have also become more
expensive in absolute terms. A lower reference interest rate
(EURIBOR) in case of euro-denominated loans more or less
offsets the increase in interest rate premia, thus nominal
lending interest rate remained nearly unchanged.
Overall, outstanding corporate credit is likely to
decrease in 2009, while banks participating in the
MNB’s FX-swap tender with a maturity of 6 months
are expected to maintain their credit portfolios. In all
likelihood, corporate credit demand will weaken in
response to higher financing costs stemming from the
deteriorating economic environment, higher interest on
HUF and foreign currency loans. Weaker demand f r
inventory financing and lower capacity utilisation will
dampen demand for working capital loans and investment
credit, respectively. Banks’ increasing reluctance to lend
will restrict credit supply, as well. This has two reasons: the
increasingly short maturities and higher costs of external
financing on the liquidity side and banks’ reduced risk
app tite on the capital side. This is likely to be reflected in
a decrease of overall exposure and in portfolio
restructuring. Based on the above assumption, the baseline
scenario for lending (see Chart 2-6) has not yet
incorporated the facts that banks participating in the
MNB’s FX-swap tender have made a commitment to
maintain their corporate credit portfolios at their 31
December 2008 levels, and that the government has
introduced several measures to support the financing of
SMEs (for further details, see Box 2-1). This may mitigate
the actual slowdown in lending. It is important to reiterate
that the curbing of lending carries risks because it may
further aggravate the economic downturn, which in turn
may also diminish the quality of the portfolios held by
households due to a higher rate of unemployment.
Therefore, from the perspective of improved economic
performance and financial stability, corporate le ing
should be prioritised even if this could lead to temporary
losses for the banking sector in the short run.
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22 Including the branches licensed to operate in Hungary. 
Chart 2-5
Characteristics of the liability structure of certain
key economic sectors
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Chart 2-6
Annual growth rate of corporate lending by the
banking sector22
(adjusted for exchange rate movements; MNB forecast for 2009-2010)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
1
 Q
4
0
2
 Q
1
0
2
 Q
3
0
3
 Q
1
0
3
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
1
0
8
 Q
3
0
9
 Q
1
0
9
 Q
3
1
0
 Q
1
1
0
 Q
3
Per cent
Note: Data projection for 2009 and 2010 along the macroeconomic
baseline scenario.
Source: MNB.
26 
The household sector’s situation seems to be improving.  Even though the 
indebtedness is rising it remains far below western European levels.70 Additionally 
the Hungarian households currently face difficulties concerning the weak forint. It 
disables them to take foreign currency loans, and on the other hand the local interest 
rate remains high making it expensive to take on debt in local currency. Similar to the 
corporate FX loan situation, the household debt portfolio also mostly consists of 
Swiss Frank loans (∼80%). This causes similar problems, but since banks have 
stopped lending in Swiss Franks, the time horizon of this problem seems limited. All 
of these factors resulted in a general decrease in demand for credit by households.71 
However the portfolio started to focus more on forint-based loans (see Figure 3), 
which is a positive trend in terms of financial stability.72 
 
Figure 373 
The liquidity risk of the banking sector was a major problem for Hungary. Liquidity 
injections from the MNB and parent banks have become more important to the well-
being of their subsidiaries, and significantly increased the trust in the banking system. 
The dependence on external funds of the Hungarian banking market remains 
relatively high due to a high loan to deposit ratio.74  In order to reduce their 
dependency on foreign capital injections, they either have to increase their deposits 
or reduce lending activity. This trend seems to be present throughout the CEE 
region, as well as the EU. The question that remains is how drastic these actions will                                                         
70 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 36 
71 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 37 
72 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 38 
73 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 38 
74 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 42 
Although the quality of the household credit
portfolio has been deteriorating, the proportion of
non-performing loans remains low in regional
comparison
There was a moderate deterioration in the quality of
the household portfolio by the end of 2008. Within
loans to households, the proportion of loans over 90 days
overdue rose during the year, while a similar increase in loans
overdue for 30-90 days also suggests further deterioration.
The adverse impact of provisions on profits also increased
slightly in 2008 (see Chart 2-22), but risk premia still provide
adequate coverage despite the increase in funding cost.
Strong growth in FX lending in previous years has
increased risks to financial stability. The HUF-FX
interest margin stemming from high risk premia, coupled
with stable exchange rates and strong credit supply led to
households predominantly becoming indebted in foreign
currency in recent years. As a result, the proportion of FX
loans is currently over 70 per cent (see Chart 2-17). As the
majority of customers failed to consider exchange rate risks,
the lack of natural hedge makes them extremely vulnerable to
changes in the HUF exchange rate. It follows that a
permanently weak forint increases the probability of defaults.
Moreover, the banks are passing the higher funding costs on
customers, which also increase debt service burden and
probability of default in the future.
The total value of new foreign currency loans is
significantly lower. Tighter conditions in foreign funding
and diffic lties in FX financing through FX swaps have had
a significant impact on both the dynamics of household
borrowing and the composition of household new debt over
recent months. Borrowing in foreign currency has fallen
markedly. By contrast, there has only been some minor
decline in borrowing in HUF. This is a positive development
from a financial stability perspective, as it reduces the share
of foreign currency loans in household debts, albeit slowly.
Furthermore, since November 2008 within the new FX
lending the euro has been gaining ground against the Swiss
franc (see Chart 2-18). This process is favourable fr m th
financial stability point of view, because it contributes to the
decrease of FX loan proportion in the total households’
loans, however slowly and on a long-term basis. 
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Chart 2-16
Distribution of the domestic housing stock based on
its encumbrance with mortgage collateral
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Source: MNB estimate.
Chart 2-17
Share of FX loans within the banks’ household loan
portfolio in international comparison
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Chart 2-18
Composition of new household loan contracts of
credit institutions by denomination
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have to be in order to improve the situation, considering that the access to 
international capital markets is becoming increasingly expensive.75 
 
The financial position of the banking sector declined in 2008, and is supposed to 
further decline in 2009 due to the unfavorable economic situation. Currently the MNB 
views the sector as being well capitalized as a whole, but at individual level there 
certainly are deficits. In order to withstand possible future shocks, the MNB suggests 
that banks should keep their capital adequacy ratio above 10%. Despite the fact that 
profitability is on the downside, it remains well above the levels of the parent banks 
home countries.76 The situation of the current loan portfolio might suggest that capital 
injections have become necessary, since non-performing loans are on the rise. 
Consequently parent banks are likely to play a more important role if the situation 
turns for the worse.77 which not only causes impairments, but also is the reason for 
soaring loan provision. In total the current environment has reduced the income 
generating capacity of the sector, with pre-tax profit expected to have declined from 
350 billion Forint in 2008 to 100-200 billion Forint in 2009.78 
 
The insurance sector in Hungary also suffered significantly due to the financial crisis, 
and is a looking at a similar deterioration of their portfolio as the banking sector. They 
are losing their capability to produce positive yields, which is specifically the case 
with unit-linked insurance products. However the insurance business tends to react 
slower than the banking world. This is for example indicated by relatively favorable 
profit figures despite the difficult situation. However these figures might also suggest 
that insurers have already adjusted their premiums in order to compensate for the 
effects of the financial crisis. It could unfortunately also point out that the 
consequences will still be felt once the real economy starts to react to the financial 
turmoil with high unemployment.79 In total 2008 was a bad year for the life insurance 
market, since they faced negative yields on their investments. This was as largely 
influenced by the downfall of unit-linked insurance. One fact that might explain this 
development is that in difficult times, households tend to shift towards other 
investments as for example deposits, since they have immediate access to it.                                                         
75 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 43 
76 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 49 
77 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 51 
78 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 50 
79 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 56 
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Another reason might be that, banks are giving out less loans, and therefore the 
insurance companies are losing the ability to sell these bank customers unit-linked 
insurance products with these loans. 80 
 
All together it can be said that the years ahead are going to be difficult for all kinds of 
financial institutions. Austrian financial institutions have always had a strong link to 
the Hungarian market, and are therefore going to continuously show their 
commitment. The current halt in growth still does not speak against the enormous 
growth potential, which remains in the country. One indicator would be the insurance 
density of life and non-life insurance in Hungary at the end of 2009 which was at 
501.40 USD, whereas in Austria the figure lies at 2,865.80 USD, and that is by no 
means the top of the latter.81  
3.3 – Slovakia 
Slovakia is yet another country that was not immediately hit by the financial crisis in 
2007, but as a very small and open economy is now feeling the consequences of the 
global financial turmoil. The financial, and especially the banking system held very 
close ties to the domestic economy with a conservative business approach. Through 
this commercial banking approach, the banks where able to finance loans largely 
through local deposits, and on the other hand where not hurt in their balance sheets 
by the fall of asset prices on the international markets. One major factor helping the 
Slovak economy through 2008 was that the introduction of the Euro in January of 
2009.  This gave the country stability in terms of currency as well as a low 
dependence on foreign funds. Additionally this indicated that the country was doing 
relatively well throughout the crisis, since otherwise the introduction of the Euro 
would have not been confirmed by the ECB.82 However it seems unreasonable to 
believe that the Slovak economy is going to be able to stay out of the most horrific 
financial crisis the world has ever seen. Perhaps the introduction of the Euro and the 
integration into the European Union will also cause a delayed recovery.83  
 
The banking system has to face the consequences of a small and open economy, 
which in the booming years was focused on export. The Slovak economy will                                                         
80 Financial Stability Report April 2009 MNB, pg. 57 
81 Swiss Re, Sigma Nr. 3/2008 Assekuranz Global 2007 
82 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 7 
83 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 45 
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ultimately face a downward trend, since the domestic-based firms in the economy will 
not be able to offset the external shocks produced by the market.84 This decrease in 
economic activity manifests itself in a decrease of GDP growth, as well as a 
reduction in investment activity and domestic consumption towards the end of 
2008.85 In the medium run the situation poses substantial risks to the Slovak 
economy. The export-based industry will not be able to be replaced by the domestic 
demand. This also limits the government’s possibilities, since in a small and open 
economy using fiscal policy only shows little effect when trying to boost economic 
activity.86 
 
In 2008 the Slovak banking sector faced a decline in profits of roughly 10%. However 
this was influenced by the bad results of one specific bank, since otherwise there 
would have been a positive growth of 6%. Specifically banks operating as branches 
of foreign banks achieved higher profitability.87 The major source for the banking 
sectors revenues was the interest income, which showed significant growth in the 
household sector (+21%), as well as the corporate sector (+17%). However, due to 
the financial crisis, there was a decreasing amount of new loans towards the end of 
2008. The provisions that had to be created grew by more than 340% to 311 million 
Euros. This is influenced by the increase in non-performing loans, and is an indicator 
for difficult times ahead.88 However according to the NBS all banks at the end of 
2008 had sufficient capital to withstand the situation. These capital stocks where 
generally bolstered up with profits from the successful previous periods, which was 
necessary due to higher capital requirements of 27%.89 When looking at the 
connection between the institutes, especially considering the high influence of one 
bad result, it should be mentioned that the systemic risk is low on the Slovak market 
due to low volumes of deposits and loans on the interbank market.90 
 
A favorable development in the banking sector was the reduction of the loan to 
deposit ratio(see Figure 1). This gives the banking sector the chance to continue 
financing loans by increasing customer deposits, while not being dependent on                                                         
84 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 8 
85 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 39 
86 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 44 
87 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 62 
88 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 9 
89 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 64 
90 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 69 
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volatile market developments. As you can see from Figure 2 and 3 the increase in 
deposits took place both in the household and the corporate sector. These 
developments where specifically present during the last quarter of 2008, and are 
certainly linked to the introduction of the Euro. However even though more deposits 
give the sector a chance to finance more projects there are many factors upsetting 
this possibility. One example of this would be the tightening of credit standards, 
which have become necessary to keep up a low risk portfolio. Due to the negative 
developments on the markets, the lending growth was more affected by the fall in 
demand than additional regulations.91 
   
      Figure 192   Figure 293   Figure 394 
The retail segment showed a positive growth at the beginning of 2008, but in the 
second half of the year these growth rates shrank considerably. One factor that had 
large influence on the development of the situation of households was the real estate 
market. The price increase during the period of 2007 until the beginning of 2008 is 
now causing problems for many households facing decreasing disposable incomes. 
They are not able to repay their loans, which were generated with high loan to value 
ratios on properties that were worth more back then than they are now.95 
 
The corporate segment showed an increase in lending of 14% in 2008. However 
when comparing this with the past, it shows that the growth in this market segment is 
also starting to stagnate. This is also enforced by the negative economic outlook,                                                         
91 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 9 
92 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 57 
93 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 58 
94 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 58 
95 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 66 
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which caused the banks to tighten their credit standards. Similarly to the retail 
segment this decrease in growth is also highly influenced by a decrease in demand 
for loans by the firms. Even though there is a negative outlook the credit quality of the 
overall corporate loan portfolio remained unchanged in 2008. Currently the segment 
is generating profits and hence remains in a liquid position.96 
 
For insurance companies 2008 was a difficult year in comparison to the previous 
booming period between 2003 and 2007(see Figure 4). Their profit was down by 
50% to 108 million Euros, which shows the drastic decrease in profitability of the 
firms acting in the market.  According to the NBS this difficult situation in the sector 
has three main reasons: 
1. The firms faced an enormous decline in the values of their assets 
2. a lower technical result in non-life insurance  
3. an increase in surrenders of life insurance policies97  
The deterioration in profit was basically a result of the bad financial result. It only 
accounted for 30% of the total profits in 2008 in comparison to 70% the year before.98 
One big surprise was the performance of the life insurance segment, which showed 
the largest growth since 2002 despite the financial crisis. This was the result of the 
performance of unit-linked insurance.  However while the life insurance segment 
soared and its technical account showed a positive balance, the non-life insurance 
segment had difficulties and decreased in comparison to the previous years.99 The 
claims incurred also increased by 115 million to 872 million Euros, which was largely 
caused by an increasing number of life insurance surrenders. Despite all difficulties 
the Slovak insurance companies where able to meet the required minimum solvency 
ratios.100  
 
                                                        
96 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 10 
97 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 11 
98 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 73 
99 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 74 
100 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 75 
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Figure 4101 
3.4 – Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian economy suffered significantly from the consequences of the financial 
crisis. Being one of the two youngest EU members it is facing one of the most 
delicate situations, which is evident through the involvement of the IMF. The liquidity 
problems, which arose in October 2008 due to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
have consequently forced the country to seek outside aid. Even though the GDP was 
still growing by 6% in 2008 the problems only really started during the last quarter of 
that year. Ever since the middle of 2008 the country was facing decreasing exports 
and imports. Additionally the liquidity released through the IMF was not directly used 
to boost the economy, since there was also a lack in demand by firms and 
households.102 Overall the industry shows mixed signals. Certain industries like 
manufacturing and construction have been hit more severely than others.  On the 
other hand financial intermediaries have shown growth even during these difficult 
times. They grew by 3.6% in 2008 mostly due to an increase in efficiency.103 The 
inflation in the economy has slowed down in 2008 to 7.2% in comparison to 11.6% in 
2007. Even though this is a positive signal the inflation still remains relatively high in 
comparison to other countries of the region.104 
 
The banking sector has been influenced by several outside factors contributing to an 
already negative environment. For instance lending to households and firms slowed                                                         
101 Financial Stability Report 2008, National Bank of Slovakia, pg. 74 
102 Annual Report BNB 2008, pg. 10 
103 Annual Report BNB 2008, pg. 18 
104 Annual Report BNB 2008, pg.  19  
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down significantly towards the end of the year. Additionally due to a lower risk 
appetite the banks ran a strategy that was based on growth in deposits rather than in 
lending. The national bank however was able to stabilize the situation in the banking 
sector by reducing the minimum reserve rate, and thereby creating additional capital 
for the banks to work with. This should not be considered as an additional risk, since 
the minimum rates in Bulgaria still remain well above the EU average. Overall it 
seems like the environment could change rather quickly, but when regarding the 
market share of the five largest banks in the market it becomes clear that it has not. 
Their market share remained at 57.1%. However it also became clear that during 
these difficult times the involvement of more developed economies within the EU has 
become greater (see Figure 1). 105  
 
Figure 1106 
The main issue that threatened financial stability during this period was credit risk. 
Banks were facing portfolios build up during booming years, which were not feasible 
during a crisis. For this reason most of them changed their risk appetite, and paid 
closer attention towards the quality of the assets under management. Additionally 
banks got problems with financing the growth strategy from previous years. Due to 
the lack in external financing they had to substantially increase deposits. All of these 
factors lower the flexibility of the system, which perhaps still will be necessary in a 
consistently volatile environment.107  
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106 Annual Report BNB 2008, pg. 39 
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Lending continued to lead banking operations, trends in it clearly reflecting develop-
ments in the sector: a first half-year of high growth and a moderation in the second half.
Dynamics of Selected Balance Sheet Indicators
(%)
Source: BNB.
Slower lending growth (on an annual basis) at 31.2 per cent for corporates and 33.7
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The asset quality has remained relatively good, even though there are negative 
trends as seen by the increase in non-performing loans. The cushion of provisions, 
which as of end-2008 stood at 114% of the non-performing loans, seems adequate to 
cover negative shocks. The financial results of the sector where still positive during 
2008, but where showing a constant downward trend in terms of growth. Therefore it 
seems unreasonable to expect that the growth in profits continue like it did in 2008, 
when it climbed to 1,374 million BGN in comparison to 1,151 million BGN in 2007. 108  
 
Figure 2109 
As one can see from Figure 2 both the household and the corporate sector faced an 
enormous drop in lending growth during the second half of 2008, standing at 33.7% 
and 31.2% respectively.110 Overall the market still has enormous potential and still is 
growing, but in comparison to the booming period of the previous 5-6 years the 
picture has changed, and some business models might have become obsolete. 
3.5 – Romania 
During the last two years Romania has seen a sharp decline in economic activity as 
well as a very difficult economic situation. The main problems are the high level of 
external debt, which mostly is short term. This problem was caused during the 
booming period, since at that time it was not difficult to get external financing, 
especially when considering the enormous outside influence in Romania’s banking 
system. Now the outside members of the market are less willing to provide the 
capital, since they themselves face difficulties and have a higher risk aversion. The  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109 Annual Report BNB 2008, pg. 39 
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Source: BNB.
Lending continued to lead banking operations, trends in it clearly reflecting develop-
ments in the sector: a first half-year of high growth and a moderation in the second half.
Dynamics of Selected Balance Sheet Indicators
(%)
Source: BNB.
Slower lending growth (on an annual basis) at 31.2 per cent for corporates and 33.7
per cent for households reflected a dramatic drop between October and December.
Though banking system’s resource base remained stable over the year, differences
in the profile of attracted funds were evident between the first and second halves. Amid
the favourable economic environment of the first two quarters, both domestic funds and
those from non-residents (provided mostly by parent institutions) financed lending.
Credit
Activity
M
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 B
a
n
kin
g
 S
yste
m
 S
ta
b
ility
  35 
once main source of growth has become the biggest vulnerability of the economy.111 
Additionally the current levels of outside liabilities and assets for households and 
companies in foreign currency indicate that the situation is rather getting worse than 
better. In Romania it has shown that economies, which face large-scale economic 
growth during one period, also face large contractions during another. 112 
 
These difficult times on the Romanian market also forced the banking sector to 
rethink its strategy. Factors like liquidity risks are on the upside. However in 
comparison to the situation of the entire economy, the banking sector has managed 
to deliver good financial results making it seem capable to withstand additional 
shocks. Unfortunately it seems as if the sector is already expecting additional 
problems, and it also should regarding the large deterioration of the credit portfolio 
during 2008 and the beginning of 2009. The reaction was to bolster up the provisions 
dedicated to non-performing loans at an above average level in comparison to other 
CEE economies. Another indicator of difficult times ahead is that the Bulgarian 
national bank has urged banks even though capital adequacy currently seems fine, 
to maintain a solvency ratio of at least 10% to be able to withstand strong shocks.113 
However new members like the Royal Bank of Scotland still enter the market114, and 
there is a general increase in the number of business outlets.115 It is clear that the 
foreign parent companies that currently own the top nine banks of the country are 
showing a commitment towards the economy, which in turn gives the market 
additional stability.116 This commitment however could cost them, since the Tier 1 
capital ratio has hit a six-year low towards the end of 2008, and they agreed to keep 
the solvency ratio equal to or above 10%.  This should be followed closely by the 
government, since it poses a real threat to the banking sector and thereby the entire 
economy.117 
 
Loan growth was down in 2008 especially in the private sector where the growth rate 
got reduced by 50% in comparison to 2007. Another disturbing tendency in the 
private sector is that loans denominated in local currency faced an even steeper                                                         
111 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 7 
112 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 8 
113 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 9 
114 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 17 
115 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg.18 
116 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 25 
117 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 26 
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downturn, which in turn means that the ratio of foreign liabilities is still growing (see 
Figure 1). The loans where mainly financed from customer deposits, since the banks 
could not rely on foreign capital anymore.118 The negotiations with the IMF however 
reduced the additional risk faced by deterioration of the leu. The help package made 
available to the country stabilized the leu, which reduced the risk mentioned 
before.119 Foreign currency risk was most common in the corporate sector, and 
therefore might still add to the bad situation.120 Unfortunately deposit growth in both 
the household and the corporate sector was slower than in previous periods.121 One 
cause for the slowdown in growth for loans might be the difficult liquidity situation a 
lot of banks faced due to the lack of external financing.  This trend has been 
persistent for the last five years, and is yet another reason for the government 
officials to worry. Whether this issue will also be cured by the involvement of the IMF 
is yet to be determined.122 
    
Figure 1123      Figure 2124 
The quality of the credit portfolio deteriorated during 2008 (see Figure 2), with a 
significant rise in overdue loans mostly denominated in local currency.125 This caused 
the amount of provisions held to cover these non-performing loans to go up. It does 
not seem like something special when compared to the trends within the CEE region 
or even the EU, but it has been taking place at a higher rate, which is a reason for  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121 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 23 
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125 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 37 
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In 2008, the share of foreign currency loans in non-government loans (Chart 3.2.21) increased to 
roughly 58 percent, a trend which persisted into 2009 Q1 also under the impact of exchange rate 
movements. Both non-government credit components posted slower growth rates in the period 
under review (Chart 3.2.22), in the context of a challenging macroeconomic environment and the 
decline in companies and households’ confidence. 
Chart 3.2.21 – Non-government loans by currency Chart 3.2.22 – Real growth rate of non-government 
loans – total and by component  
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Despite the increase in the share of long-term loans21 to 56 percent of non-government credit in late 
2008 and in 2009 Q1 (Chart 3.2.23), their growth rate decelerated.  
 
                                                     
21 Long-term loans are defined as loans with maturity of over five years. 
Chart 3.2.19 – Bank assets and non-government 
loans 
Chart 3.2.20 – Bank assets and non-government  
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“su standard”, “doubtful” and “loss” (u adjusted exposure) were much faster (67 percent,  
92 percent and 130 percent respectively) than the 33 percent annual growth rate of credit portfolio 
of non-bank clients at end-2008. Moreover, in March 2009, credit quality deteriorated at a faster 
pace (loans classified under the above-mentioned categories saw growth rates of 10 percent,  
44 percent and 47 percent respectively versus December 2008, given the marginal rise of 1 percent 
in total loan portfolio).  
The effects of the unfavourable macroeconomic context are reflected by the share of past-due and 
doubtful claims (n t value) in total bank assets and Tier 1 capital (Chart 3.2.29), which posted a 
twofold increase (up to 0.31 percent and 3.38 percent respectively) in 2007-2008 and again in 2009 
Q1 (up to 0.52 percent and 5.95 percent respectively). Despite the extremely fast deterioration of 
loan portfolio quality, which req ires the particularly close scrutiny from both banks and the 
supervisory authority, the volume of past-due claims remains at a relatively low level. 
These developments notwithstanding, the quality of the loan portfolio of Romanian credit 
institutions is better than that of banks in several EU Member States (Chart 3.2.30), owing also to 
the fact that domestic credit institutions did not hold toxic assets in their portfolios and the effects 
of the global financial crisis and worldwide recession were manifest starting with the final quarter 
of 2008. 
 
 
Chart 3.2.28 – Credit quality in the banking system Chart 3.2.29 – Credit quality in the banking system 
  
Source: NBR Source: NBR 
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concern.126 Therefore with the increase in caution in lending by banks in order to hold 
“safe” loans in their portfolio, and the following slowdown in growth for loans, the 
situation of the economy should stabilize.  
 
In contrast to all indications mentioned above, the banking sector was still able to 
present good financial results for 2008. The net aggregate profit increased by 73.9% 
in comparison to 2007 reaching 4,681.9 million leu.127 The operating income also 
showed good results, and was mainly driven by the net interest income (46.2%) and 
the net income from commissions (28.1%).128 Due to the crisis and the increasing 
amount of non-performing loans the provisions grew by 65% in 2008, which 
describes the deterioration of the credit portfolio held by the institutes.129 
 
The insurance market, as it is still in a convergence period, still showed significant 
growth in 2008 (see Figure 3).  However it did feel the effects of the financial crisis, 
and is facing higher risks in both non-life and life insurance.  In terms of development 
both market segments (life and non-life) grew at a similar pace.  The auto- and credit-
insurance segments are of specific concern. The developments in these areas 
specifically hurt the technical result of non-life insurance especially in the case of 
auto insurance. It grew to become the major part of non-life products, but currently is 
also facing an enormous increase in claims. The development of the life insurance 
segment was similar. It still showed significant growth, but on the other hand there 
were more redemptions, which where mainly the result of the financial crisis.130 Also 
as a result of the financial crisis the profitability of the insurance sector declined.131 
Overall the insurance market in Romania is showing increasing volatility due to the 
difficulties on the financial markets. For life insurers the situation seems less risky 
than for non-life insurance companies, since they can transfer some of the risk held 
to their clients.132 
                                                        
126 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 40 
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130 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 53 
131 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 54 
132 Romania Financial Stability Report 2009, pg. 55 
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Figure 3133 
3.6 – Ukraine 
The Ukraine has the biggest problems out of the selected countries. Their crisis 
stems from both internal as well as external problems. They have been hit hard by 
the financial crisis, and additionally they are lacking a stable and consequent political 
system, which would be necessary to resolve the problems ahead.  The government 
has failed to adjust its policy according to the situation, and therefore even though 
the Ukraine has returned on a growth path in 2009 the country is still looking at a 
deficit of 9-10% of the GDP. The presidential race of January 2010, which was won 
by the pro-Russian candidate, is not expected to bring in the long-awaited political 
relief.134 
 
The country has been lacking a clear economic policy for quite some time. It has 
been very pro-cyclical. This worked as long as the large GDP growth was covering 
up the real problems of the country, which are a soaring inflation and unemployment 
rate as well as increasing external debt. The combination of delayed policy decisions, 
an unfriendly business environment, and a severe recession towards the end of 2008 
painted a rough path through the crisis. At the end of 2008 the internal and external 
demand for products slumped, and with the enormous deterioration of the Ukrainian 
hryvnia (-60%) all banks faced a very delicate situation. The banking sector was 
forced to react to large capital outflows, and a difficult financing situation due to the 
liquidity crisis caused by the Lehman collapse. This emergency situation that almost 
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134 RZB Research Strategy Ukraine December 2009, pg. 1 
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Chart 3.3.11 – Insurance market developments Chart 3.3.12 – Credit insurance developments 
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Market concentration remained high throughout 2008, as top-ten insurance companies accounted 
for approximately 89.3 percent of total gross subscribed premiums in non-life insurance and 93.7 
percent of gross subscribed premiums in life insurance. Given that, following the large-scale 
acquisitions on the insurance market in Romania, some of these companies became part of the 
same international financial group, the resulting level of concentration is even higher. 
Chart 3.3.13 – Profitability of insurance companies Chart 3.3.14 – Key investments of insurance 
companies
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Profitability indicators calculated for the Romanian insurance market continued to worsen as a 
result of poorer technical results. The increase in auto insurance claims made the negative technical 
result for non-life insurance to deteriorate further, whereas the volume of indemnities and 
redemptions for life insur nce policies doubled. Faster rowth of losses in urred by the insurance 
sector as a whole in comparison to the developments in capitalisation or total assets pushed ROE 
  39 
caused the market to collapse, forced the authorities to seek help from the IMF, 
which was approved in November 2008.135 
 
The money lent by the IMF has managed to keep the market relatively stable, and 
most importantly re-earn the trust of the market members. This led to increasing 
willingness of foreign banks to inject capital into their Ukrainian subsidiaries. 
Gradually the exchange rate returned to normal levels, the inflation rate fell and 
demand also started to pick up again. Never the less, the Ukraine remains a 
troublemaker. Their continuous conflict with Russia about the gas-transit routes to 
Europe, the populist promises made by the government and their lacking ability to 
make the necessary reforms keeps the IMF on its feet. Since the agreement between 
the super-national institution and the country, the disbursement of the loan tranches 
has already been postponed twice.136 
 
Despite the improving economic situation, the banking sector is still looking at difficult 
times. The non-performing loans are on the rise, and the pro-cyclical stand of the 
country remains to this day. This causes the Ukraine to be very dependent on global 
economic trends. The long-term strategy can only be to increase the domestic 
demand and thereby reduce the dependency of global trends.137 With this significant 
amount of hurdles in the way, the country still has a long way to go, but most 
certainly keeps its enormous potential.  The improving export conditions might be of 
help for a recovery, but in a historic context it might also be a potential risk. In the 
early 2000’s the Ukraine has managed to keep its exports high through an artificially 
low valued currency, and thereby gave the government only limited possibilities to 
react. Private consumption is most likely still going to suffer from the outcomes of the 
financial crisis due to lower wages, an increasing unemployment rate, and little credit 
available from the banking sector.138 Looking forward analysts believe that the 
Ukraine will possibly have to continuously rely on the IMF to bridge its finance gaps, 
even though the organization has already pumped 4.8 billion USD into the market, 
which accounts for roughly 4% of the countries GDP.139 
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The banking sector was one the countries’ success stories of the early 2000’s, and 
even after the financial crisis remains one the driving forces in the domestic 
economy. The continuous unhedged FX lending in combination with the worsening 
economic situation and exchange rate, caused several bank runs towards the end of 
2008 causing a capital outflow of nearly 25% of the deposit base. The enormous 
outflow of deposits becomes clear when looking at Figure 1 below. Even though the 
situation has gotten better, foreign exchange risk still remains very high, since most 
foreign currency loans where given to people without income in foreign currency. 
Hence a volatile and low-valued local currency makes it close to impossible for 
borrowers to repay their credit. This situation contributes to a rising non-performance 
loans ratio (see Figure 2), and thereby to an increased need for provisions making it 
harder for the banks to produce profits.140 
   
                            Figure 1141         Figure 2142 
The additional lack of liquidity in the market has caused most of the market members 
to stop their lending activity. Some banks still lend to already existing clients, but 
overall one can say that credit is basically not available. Even though the government 
is trying to keep the stability within the system in tact by buying stakes of insolvent 
companies, relaxing capital requirements and an increase in the maximum deposit 
insurance the easy times seem to be over. The banking sector will have to adapt to a 
new business model, which is completely different than the one in tact, but similar to 
approaches in other countries of the region. Banks will have to focus on lending 
activity in local currency, which will be financed via domestic deposits.143  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4 – Companies 
 
This section will provide an insight on the operations of the companies reviewed by 
this thesis. These where selected, since they are the largest players on the Austrian 
market, and have the highest influence in the region under review. In order to give a 
balanced picture of the Austrian financial service industry the thesis concentrates on 
both the banking and the insurance market (see Figure 1). 
 
Market Position Bank Insurance 
1 UniCredit Bank Austria Vienna Insurance Group 
2 Raiffeisen International Uniqa 
3 Erste Group  
Figure 1144 
 
The individual sub-chapters for each institute will be divided into two parts. At first 
there will be a general description of their situation and strategy, followed by a 
description of the subsidiaries in the countries under review.  
 
4.1 – UniCredit Bank Austria 
4.1.1 – Overview & Strategy 
UniCredit Bank Austria is currently Austria’s biggest bank in terms of assets, and 
holds a market share of approximately 19% making it the market leader145. They are 
not only the biggest bank in Austria, but are also taking the leading position in the 
CEE region. They currently hold 139 billion Euros of assets, and serve around 24 
million customers in 18 different countries. This service is brought to the customers 
through a network of roughly 2,824 branches that are run by 57,000 employees. 
Even though it is part of one of the biggest banks of Europe, Bank Austria plays a 
special role for Eastern Europe. Since the beginning of 2007, they became a sub-
holding company responsible for all group activities in the region except for Poland 
and the Ukraine. That they are doing a great job is shown by the 50% increase in 
profit before taxes to over 2 billion Euros in 2008 despite the economical situation.146                                                         
144 Author’s investigation 
145 UniCredit Group – leading in Central and Eastern Europe Brochure, June 2008, pg. 7 
146 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/central-eastern-
europe-cee-division.html 
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The strategy which has been in place since they were promoted to be the sub-
holding company for the CEE region, involves three different approaches: 
• A regional focus on large and quickly growing economies where the group 
enjoys a strong market position, as for example Romania.  
• A divisional approach on retail banking, in order to be able to foster the 
expansion of their lending network through funds from local deposits.  
• A cross-regional approach that ensures communication among all segments 
of the company to increase product quality (i.e. offering investment banking 
products and knowledge through local branches).147 
 
For them the crisis is not only viewed as a threat, but also as an opportunity to align 
the structure within the company.  This includes the concentration on high net worth 
individuals in private banking handled by Pioneer Investments, which is responsible 
for all the asset management activities.148 Another effort will be to combine the 
corporate banking segment with the knowledge in the investment banking division, 
and thereby create a useful knowledge-platform for the customer. They believe that 
their strategy of organic growth, and a focus on retail banking is successful and does 
not have to be changed. However it is mentioned that due to the current economical 
situation the capital involvement in the subsidiaries will be minimal.149 
 
Their retail banking division was not able to escape the difficult market situation and 
could not keep up with figures reached in previous years, which is one reason for the 
service-quality focus currently implemented in retail banking.150 In corporate banking 
they further implemented their strategy to bundle their individual knowledge groups 
and thereby create a segment, which is only responsible for the activities of large and 
multi-national companies. This is supposed enable them to serve their largest clients 
                                                        
147 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/central-eastern-
europe-cee-division-2.html 
148 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/strategy-confirmed-
by-crisis-3.html 
149 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/strategy-confirmed-
by-crisis-4.html 
150 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/retail-division.html 
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at a faster and more efficient rate.151 Despite all that the corporate banking section 
will also have to increase its productivity due to the difficult economic situation.152 
4.1.2 – Region 
In Bulgaria, Bank Austria has control over UniCredit Bulbank. They are the market 
leader with a market share of roughly 15%, and are serving 1.2 million customers 
through a network of 263 branches. However the bank as of 2006 focused on being 
the top provider of loans on the once rapidly growing mortgage market as well as 
small businesses and leasing segments. These segments tend to be the ones facing 
the largest difficulties in the crisis.153 In 2008 the subsidiary managed to increase its 
total revenues by 7.1% to 611.9million BGN, as well as increasing its net operating 
income by 5.7% to 352.7 million BGN. Unfortunately their deposits declined by 4.9%, 
while their loans increased by 38.4%. This clearly is opposed to their strategy 
mentioned before.154 They increased their retail and corporate banking revenues by 
19% and 20.6% respectively despite the difficult economic situation. In total the 
Bulgarian subsidiary is in a good position for 2009, but they will have to focus their 
efforts on increasing their customer deposits.155 
 
UniCredit Bank Czech Republic is currently the 4th largest bank on the market with a 
market share of 7%, and a total asset value of 11.6 billion Euros. They are serving 
more than 568,000 customers through 63 branches.156 The retail segment faced a 
decrease in deposits of 2% in 2008, while their loan portfolio increased by 8%. 
However they believe that the strategy of focusing on small and affluent business 
customers is the right approach in a troubled economic environment. In the corporate 
segment the bank has successfully focused on the SME business. Additionally they 
bring improvements to large international customers by being able to serve them 
through a multinational network.157 Despite all these positive facts analysts have a 
negative outlook for 2009 due to the financial and economic crisis.158                                                         
151 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/corporates-
division.html 
152 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/central-eastern-
europe-cee-division-2.html 
153 UniCredit Group – leading in Central and Eastern Europe Brochure, June 2008, pg. 18 
154 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/bulgaria.html 
155 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/bulgaria-2.html 
156 UniCredit Group – leading in Central and Eastern Europe Brochure, June 2008, pg. 22 
157 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/czech-republic.html 
158 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/czech-republic-
2.html 
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In Hungary UniCredit Bank holds the 7th position on the market with a market share 
of approximately 6%, and a total asset value of 6.1 billion Euros. They are serving 
approximately 238,000 customers through 83 branches.159 Despite the troublesome 
times the country itself is facing, the branch has managed to show record braking 
results. This was however partially a result of selling their holdings of the Budapest 
Stock Exchange. In the retail segment the branch is operating very successfully both 
in the lending and deposit business. They managed to increase their retail loans and 
deposits enormously in 2008 (47% and 49% respectively). The corporate segment 
has also managed to maintain its high profitability, and a market share of 9.1% both 
in the lending and the deposit business.160 The focus of the Hungarian subsidiary in 
2009 is to maintain the successful corporate business with an emphasis on mid-
market clients, and to further increase its retail operations.161 
 
In Romania the group is represented by the Tiriac Bank, which holds the fourth 
position on the Romanian banking market. They are holding a market share of 5.3% 
in deposits and 6.2% in loans, with a total asset value of 17.5 billion RON. Their 
network includes 242 branches, which distribute to its 606,000 customers. The 
subsidiary was under constant change during the last couple of years due to three 
mergers. This of course resulted in a high employee turnover. Never the less they 
managed to increase their revenues and net operating profit by 31% and 41% 
respectively. In their retail segment they managed to increase their loan portfolio to 
private individuals (+46%), and focused on developing a strong connection to small 
and medium businesses. In their corporate segment they managed to increase their 
loan portfolio by 52% while increasing their deposit portfolio by 57%. In total they 
managed to increase their revenue by 36% in comparison to 2007. For the near 
future the goal of the Tiriac bank will be to increase their efficiency and profitability 
while only allowing moderate growth.162 
 
In Slovakia, UniCredit Bank holds the 4th position on the market, with a market share 
of around 8%.163 For Slovakia the Bank has a comparatively large network of 86                                                         
159 UniCredit Group – leading in Central and Eastern Europe Brochure, June 2008, pg. 24 
160 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/hungary.html 
161 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/hungary-2.html 
162 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/romania.html 
163 UniCredit Group – leading in Central and Eastern Europe Brochure, June 2008, pg. 38 
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branches, which is serving its 183,000 customers. In 2009 their main goals were to 
prepare for the euro inauguration, while facing the effects of the crisis. They 
increased their net profit by 33% to 71.8 million Euros. Their current portfolio holds 
2.6 billion Euros in loans and 2.7 billion Euros in deposits, which goes along with 
their strategy. In the retail segment there was an increase in loans of 16.1%, which is 
larger than the growth in deposits (+10%). However the deposits remain three times 
as high in total value (1.2 billion Euros). In the corporate segment the company is 
facing a different situation. In 2008 there was a decrease in loan volume to 2.2 billion 
Euros due to the effects of the crisis, but an increase of 4.7% in deposits to 1.6 billion 
Euros. From this one can tell that this subsidiary is doing relatively well, but in 2009 
will still have to focus on resolving the effects of the crisis.164 
4.2 – Erste Group 
4.2.1 – Overview & Strategy 
Erste Group owns companies in five of the seven countries under review by this 
thesis. They are one of the major players in the region, is currently operating under a 
different strategy than the other two banks in this report. It is the only one that began 
to concentrate on its core segment, retail banking. They are not focusing on niche 
products, but rather on a broad portfolio of standard and simple banking products 
offered to a wide range of possible customers.165 Due to the financial crisis the group 
has focused on countries that, “…had a realistic prospect of EU membership,”166 
while limiting their exposure in countries that are facing higher risks. Without the 
crisis their portfolio would be more balanced, but in difficult times it seems 
reasonable to concentrate on countries that have back up from the EU. In total Erste 
Group offers their products to 17.2 million customers through approximately 3,200 
branches in eight countries (see Figure 1) across the CEE region.167 
                                                        
164 http://geschaeftsbericht.bankaustria.at/2008/gb/en/unicredit-group-at-a-glance-/slovakia.html 
165 Annual report Erste Group 2008 pg. 26 
166 Annual report Erste Group 2008 pg. 3 
167 Annual report Erste Group 2008 pg. 25 
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Figure 1168 
 
Erste Group’s firs move towards Eastern Europe was in the late 1990’s when they 
realized that their future was dependent on whether they found sufficient possibilities 
outside of Austria. Simply cost-cutting at home would have just made the company a 
potential target for larger players on the market. For this reason they started to enter 
Austria’s neighboring countries via selected acquisitions, and thereby extend their 
home market.169 In the last couple of years, Erste Group has faced several structural 
changes as for example selling their insurance business section to VIG for 630.8 
million Euros. This action specifically boosted their balance sheet in 2008 giving them 
the possibility to soften the effects of the financial crisis. Even though they sold most 
of their insurance business, they agreed with VIG that that the local subsidiaries 
would continue to hold five percent of the insurance companies in addition to a 
mutual sales agreement.170 This way Erste Group has managed to focus on its core 
segment retail banking, but is still taking part in the upside of the insurance business. 
Another structural change in their business model was that they standardized several 
activities as for example; debt capital markets, treasury, equity capital markets, real 
estate, corporate banking etc, and established the Global Markets and the Group 
Corporate Investment Banking divisions.171 
                                                         
168 Annual Report 2008 Erste Bank, pg. i.v. 3 
169 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 25 
170 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 30 
171 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 26 
 SLOVAKIA
 Employees: 4,953
 Branches: 275
 Customers: 2.6 m
 CROATIA
 Employees: 2,061
 Branches: 119
 Customers: 0.7 m
 HUNGARY
 Employees: 3,255
 Branches: 203
 Customers: 0.8 m
 SERBIA
 Employees: 1,009
 Branches: 68
 Customers: 0.2 m
 CZECH REP.
 Employees: 10,865
 Branches: 658
 Customers: 5.3 m 
 AUSTRIA
 Employees: 16,278
 Branches: 274  
 Customers: 1.1 m
 Branches: 786
 Customers: 1.9 m
 ROMANIA
 Employees: 9,985
 Branches: 641
 Customers: 4.5 m
 UKRAINE
 Employees: 2,120
 Branches: 135
 Customers: 0.1 m
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The financial data for Erste Group in 2008 look good considering the effects of the 
crisis. Their operating profit in 2008 increased by 19.3%, while the general 
administrative expenses only rose by approximately 10%(see Figure 2). This results 
in a record breaking operating result increase of 19.3% and a good cost/income ratio 
of 57.2%, which compares favorably to the competition.172 The total assets of the 
group only rose by 0.5%, which was influenced by the sale of the insurance unit (if 
adjusted it would have been a 4.7% increase).173 Despite these positive results Erste 
Group also had to face the effects of the financial crisis when for instance they had to 
deal with the negative overall result from financial assets, which was at -570.6 million 
Euros in 2008. This devaluation took place even though there was no deterioration in 
the performance of the underlying assets, and was influenced by the troubles in 
Iceland and the collapse of Lehman Brothers.174     
      
      Figure 2175                  Figure 3176 
As you can tell from Figure 3, the increase in general administrative expenses is 
mostly a result of depreciation, and not an increase in personnel expenses. This 
represents a big change in comparison to the preceding years, where the increase in 
personnel expenses was the most influential factor. This shows the effects of the 
crisis, since the expansion process becomes more selective and therefore slows an 
increase in employees. 
 
                                                        
172 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 31 
173 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 32 
174 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 34 
175 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 31 
176 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 33 
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The crisis also resulted in an increase in non-performing loans of 2.9% in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 in comparison to Q3. Additionally the level of risk provisions 
increased from 3.3 billion Euros to 3.8 billion Euros. However customer deposits 
increased by 9.2% from 100.1 billion to 109.3 billion Euros, whereas loans increased 
by 10.7% from 114 to 126.2 billion Euros in 2008 resulting in a strong loan to deposit 
ratio of 115.4% in 2008.  While Erste Group in comparison to many competitors was 
able to increase their tier 1 capital to approximately 7.4 billion Euros177, their solvency 
ratio reduced to 10.1%. This is still comfortably above the 8% minimum requirement, 
but never the less 0.4% below the value of 2007.178 
 
Since modern, western retail banking was not existent in the region up to a couple of 
years ago; it seemed reasonable for Erste Group to focus on the retail segment.179 
This also apparently is one reason why the CEE region was initially not as affected 
by the financial crisis. The growth was not a sign of an overheating economy, but 
rather of a lot of to catch up potential. This becomes clear when regarding the wealth 
management segment, which is another focus of Erste Group. They see enormous 
catch up potential (see Figure 4), which is the reason why they expanded the share 
of its fund management activities to 20%, hence dominating the market. However 
with the current crisis, it is difficult to project at what point the wealth management 
segment is going to become important. They argue that based on historic trends, 
many countries in the CEE region are close to breaking a barrier of GDP per capita 
at which wealth management gains relevance.180 
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Figure 4181 
4.2.2 – Region 
In the Czech Republic Erste Group is represented by Česká spořitelna and its 
subsidiaries. It currently holds the top position on the retail market and the second 
place in terms of total assets. In 2008 they where serving about 5.3 million clients 
through a network of 658 branches.182 In 2008 they managed to increase their 
deposits by 19.3%, while the loan growth slowed down to 12%. The slow down was 
primarily driven by a decrease in mortgages where Erste Group holds the leading 
position. They faced a decrease in their trading result due to currency devaluation 
towards the end of 2008. Additionally there was an increase in administrative 
expenses of 17.6%, and an increase in risk provisions of 66.3% to 116.6 million 
Euros. However despite the negative development of the currency and the economy, 
there was still an increase in the operating result of 41.7% to 773.8 million Euros.183 
All of this resulted in a total exposure 28.6 billion Euros, which was equal to 13% of 
Erste Group`s total exposure. 184 
 
Banca Comercială Română (BCR) currently represents Erste Group in Romania, 
which was the market leader on the Romanian banking market in 2008, serving 4.5 
million customers through a network of 641 branches. Even though they were able to 
sustain their leading position on the market, they most certainly faced strong 
competition and hence a decreasing market share. This was the case, because 
many other competitors had highly levered portfolios, and were therefore  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aggressively competing for low margin deposits. Since BCR’s portfolio was already 
carefully balanced before the crisis, they did not have to compete in this price war. 
Their goal is to maintain their leading position through cutting costs, and a continued 
to expansion of their network.185 The operating result of the Romanian operations 
more than doubled in 2008, reaching 547.7 million Euros in comparison to 270.8 
million Euros in 2007. Meanwhile there was also an increase in net interest income of 
45.2%, which resulted from a strong rise in customer loans. On the other hand there 
was a 11.5% decline in administrative expenses due to less employees and lower 
restructuring costs. All together it caused the cost to income ratio to significantly 
improve to 45.5% from 65.6% in 2007. However the financial crisis resulted in rising 
risk provisions as well as an increase in the non-performing loans ratio (+1.8%). The 
Romanian operations in 2008 had a total exposure of 13.2 billion Euros, which is 
equal to approximately 6% of Erste Group’s total exposure.186 
 
Erste Group is currently represented by Slovenská sporiteľna (SLSP) in Slovakia. 
They are a formerly state owned savings bank that currently serves around 2.6 
million customers through a network of 275 branches. They currently hold the 
number one position in retail banking, asset management, leasing and factoring.187 
Their intension is to maintain that leading position in the retail market. That is of 
specific importance when considering the introduction of the Euro, which caused a 
large increase in deposits of 37%. There was also significant growth in the loan 
portfolio of 24% primarily driven by housing loans,188 which led to an increase of net 
interest income of 14.9% to 334.8 million Euros in 2008. All of this led to an increase 
in the operating result of 20.9% to 216.3 million Euros. However due to the 
introduction of the Euro there was also an increase in administrative expenses of 
13.3%, since it created the need for a new core banking system. The exposure of the 
Slovak market as of 2008 was 8.5 billion Euros, or approximately 4% of Erste Groups 
total exposure.189  
 
Erste Bank Hungary was the second biggest bank in terms of clients in 2008. It 
serves approximately 800,000 clients through a network of 200 branches.  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Additionally they have a strategic partnership with the Hungarian Post enabling them 
to access 327 online post offices.190 Due to the financial crisis the strategy of Erste 
Bank Hungary had to be reorganized, since many parts of the business plan were not 
feasible anymore. For example they had to completely remove their FX lending in 
Swiss Francs, which has become unpopular due to the deterioration of the local 
currency. This decline in FX lending also had the effect that the real estate market 
shrank, which presented an opportunity to the group. Many market-members where 
not able to finance projects anymore, and therefore the group had the possibility to 
hand pick the best-looking projects.  When regarding the financial statement, Erste 
Bank Hungary managed to increase both their net interest income as well as their net 
commission income by 19.8% and 7.4% respectively. Their administrative expenses 
grew by 8%, which was a result of the expansion process, and an increase in risk 
provisions by 15.7%. In total the operating result of the operations in Hungary 
increased by 18.6%. Overall the development was successful considering the 
worsening market conditions, which is indicated by the improvement of the cost to 
income ratio to 52.1% in 2008.191 The group’s total exposure in the market was 8.5 
billion Euros, or 4% of the total exposure of Erste Group.192  
 
Erste Bank Ukraine (EBU) currently only takes the position of a start up operation 
since it was only opened at the beginning of 2007. As of 2008 they were managing 
roughly 65,000 clients through a network of 135 branches. Due to the small 
involvement in the market, the subsidiary only ranked 23rd, which equals a market 
share of approximately 1% in most product categories.193 The main goal of the 
operation at the current time is to improve the position in retail banking. However this 
goal due to the financial turmoil has to be reached differently than it was planned at 
the start of the operations in 2007. At the moment it is simply not reasonable to 
enlarge their network through acquisitions, or as a matter of fact increase the 
involvement in the market at all. In 2007 they planned on playing a role in the 
housing market, which does not seem to be a smart thing to do in the current 
situation. Never the less EBU managed to double its loan portfolio to 600 million 
Euros despite the fact that the market was coming to a halt at the end of 2008.194   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Deposits quadrupled, but remain at a low level of 45 million Euros in 2008. They 
managed to increase their operating result to 45.1 million Euros, which was mainly 
driven by the increase of net interest income (+312.5%). On the other hand the 
administrative expenses increased to 56.2 million Euros due to expanding the branch 
network and increasing the number of employees, which resulted in a loss after 
minorities of 28.7 million Euros.  However when regarding the Ukrainian market it has 
to be said that this market only represents 0.4% of the total exposure of the group at 
747 million Euros. 195 
4.3 – Raiffeisen International 
4.3.1 – Overview & Strategy 
Raiffeisen is a banking conglomerate with a lot of influence in Austria, despite that in 
terms of banking assets it lacks behind UniCredit Bank Austria. Raiffeisen 
International is a subsidiary of Raiffeisen Zentralbank (RZB) responsible for their 
business in Eastern Europe. By the end of 2008 the company was operating in 17 
markets (see Figure 1) serving more than 14.7 million customers through 63,376 
employees in 3,231 business outlets. The subsidiaries run mutually exclusive from 
each other, and thereby do not create systemic risk within the company. Their 
successful business model has brought seven of their subsidiaries into the top three 
banks of their country.196  
 
                                                        
195 Annual Report 2008 Erste Group, pg. 63 
196Raiffeisen International Annual Report 2008, pg. 30 
  53 
 
Figure 1197 
Unfortunately with the recent crisis their business focus also had to adapt. Now their 
strategic focus is on the expansion of deposits, and on the quality of their assets 
rather than expanding their already large market positions through acquisitions. The 
firm is currently holding back from merger opportunities due to the unfavorable 
environment, since the capital might become necessary in other areas.198 
 
The financial situation of the bank was exceptionally well in 2008, especially 
considering that most rating agencies and the IMF expected banks with strong 
involvement in CEE region to face difficult times. In 2008 Raiffeisen International’s 
profit from operating activities grew by nearly 40% reaching 2,247 million Euros.199 
Their general administrative expenses grew by 21% to 2633 million Euros, which was 
influenced by a large increase in staff costs of 18%. Due to the large increase in 
operating income this meant a favorable development in the cost to income ratio by 
3.6% to 54% in 2008.  These developments ultimately also put the profit before taxes 
at a record level, but the first difficulties started to come up.200  
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The provisioning for impairment losses increased by 119% to 780 million Euros, and 
therefore caused a relatively lower increase in profit before taxes in comparison to 
the operating profit. Due to this the risk to earning ratio also climbed from 14.8% to 
24.1%. Geographically speaking the largest part was allocated in the CIS region, 
specifically the Ukraine. In this region the risk to earning ratio grew by 28%. The CEE 
region’s ratio grew by 26%, while the lowest growth came from South-Eastern 
Europe with 17%.201  
 
The profit after taxes and minorities increased by 17% to 982 million Euros in 2008. 
Without the valuation losses due to currency fluctuations the profit would have easily 
crossed the one billion Euro barrier. The Ukrainian hyrvnia and the currencies of 
several other currencies where under pressure during the period, which resulted in a 
total valuation loss of 873 million Euros during 2008.202 In order to meet the 
increasing demand for capital Raiffeisen International has started a cost cutting 
program. The expansion of the branch network will be postponed, or at least will be 
bound to strict conditions. Additionally no new employees should be further recruited 
in 2009, and the number of employees in the CIS region will be reduced.203 
 
For the near future the bank sees difficult times ahead of them. The recession in the 
Western world is also lowering the demand for CEE export goods, and reducing the 
direct investment from these developed economies. Through this the financing costs 
are increasing, which is ultimately going to limit credit growth and thereby slow down 
a recovery.  The governments will focus on the soaring budget deficits and the 
interest payments rather than promoting growth.204 Despite these threats, Raiffeisen 
International believes that the region’s potential has remained. The only thing that 
has changed is that the focus will be on deposits, rather than on loan growth.205 
 
The corporate customer division showed strong growth in 2008 with an increase in 
profit before tax of 32% to 884 million Euros. The growth in the operating income was 
34% reaching 1,678 million Euros. Unfortunately the provisions for impairment losses  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also doubled to 269 million Euros. The general administrative expenses in this 
division on the other hand only grew by 18%, thereby improving the cost to income 
ratio to 31.3%. With its highest profit in history, and all of the positive developments, 
the corporate division has further increased its stake of total earnings to 62%.206 
However during the final months of 2008 the picture began to change. The division’s 
strategy was adapted to attract mid-market customers in order to improve the 
diversity in the portfolio keeping the focus on deposits and cash management.207 
 
The retail customers division did not witness such positive developments. The profit 
before tax fell by 11% to 435 million Euros, and additionally there was a 133% 
increase in provisions for impairment losses of 507 million Euros. The branch 
expansion program further increased the general administrative expenses by 22% to 
1,876 million Euros. However there were also some positive developments. For 
instance they managed to increase the operating income by 25% to 2,819 million 
Euros, and despite high expenses they decreased the cost to income ratio by 1.7% 
to 66.6%. All together the retail division has felt the crisis more significantly, which is 
also indicated by the drop in the division’s share of the total earnings (-9%). 
Nevertheless the division feels it has a strong position throughout the region, and 
when the growth picks back up so will the profit margins. Similarly to the corporate 
division, their main goal will be to increase the amount of deposits.208  
4.3.2 – Region 
Raiffeisen International divides their subsidiaries into three regions: 
• Central Europe – CE 
o Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia 
• Southeastern Europe – SEE 
o Bulgaria, Romania 
• Commonwealth of Independent States – CIS 
o Ukraine209 
 
In the CE region the profit fell by 2% to 442 million Euros. Therefore the region has 
remained dominant in terms of assets (43%), but in terms of earnings it is lacking  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behind the CIS and the SEE region.210 This slowdown can be explained by higher 
provisioning for impairment losses.211 Due to this negative trend the risk to earnings 
ratio increased by 11% to 25.9%. The net fee and commission income grew by 21%, 
out of which the largest growth was registered in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
Their general administrative expenses grew by 18% to 930 million Euros. This was 
highly influenced by a staff increase of 10% and 40 new outlets, which were opened 
during 2008. All together the region’s cost to income ratio developed favorably, 
decreasing by 1.9% to 56.8%.212 
 
In Slovakia Raiffeisen has control over Tatra banka, the third largest bank of the 
country. As of the end of 2008 they had 3,885 employees, which served 744,000 
customers through 162 business outlets. This subsidiary is adapting successfully to 
the new strategy, which is easily seen by the large increase of deposits (+34.6%). 
The large increase to 7.5 billion Euros in deposits in comparison to a total of 6.2 
billion Euros in loans is very favorable. The good development of the subsidiary is 
also seen through the development in the cost to income ratio, which decreased to 
53.3% in comparison to 56.2% in 2007. This decrease is comparatively larger than 
the regions average (-1.9%), and also leaves the country with a lower than average 
cost to income ratio.213  
 
In the Czech Republic, Raiffeisen currently has a market share of roughly 4%, which 
puts them into the top 5 largest banks of the market. Their 2,654 employees are 
serving 411,000 customers through 107 business outlets. Their development of the 
loan to deposit ratio was not quite as favorable as in Slovakia. The deposits 
increased by 18.7% to 4.2 billion Euros, but unfortunately their loan portfolio grew 
faster (+25.6%) hitting 5.5 billion Euros. Nevertheless the subsidiary has managed to 
become more efficient, which is clearly shown by the 8% decrease in the cost to 
income ratio, but it still remains above the region’s average of 56.8%.214 
 
Hungary is one of the largest subsidiaries of Raiffeisen International. They currently 
are the 5th largest bank on the market. With 3,960 employees they are serving  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657,000 customers through 164 business outlets. The loans increased by 13.3% to 
7.2 billion Euros while the deposits rose by 16.4% to 5.7 billion Euros, hence the loan 
to deposit ratio developed favorably. This ratio still has to be improved concerning 
their strategy, but it is already on the right path. Their cost to income ratio 
unfortunately increased during the period from 55.9% to 58.5% showing a decrease 
in efficiency.215 
 
In the SEE region the profit before tax showed an increase of 12% reaching 534 
million Euros. This strong increase was largely influenced by the increase in net 
interest (+29%) and net fee and commission income (+20%).216 The allocations for 
provisions from impairment losses showed an excessive growth of 171% to 159 
million Euros, but they started from a very low level. When comparing it with the other 
two regions it still remains the lowest level.  The regions non-performing loans 
increased to 2.26 percent, showing the increasing uncertainty on the financial 
markets. Their general administrative expenses grew by 20% to 773 million Euros. 
One factor that had a large influence in this was the increase in the workforce of 21% 
in comparison to 2007.  In total the region is doing very well with a low cost to income 
ration of 51.9%217, and the second highest profit of all regions.218  
 
In Bulgaria Raiffeisen has been part of the banking market since 1994. They are 
currently fourth on the market, serving 653,000 customers through a network of 
3,700 employees in 197 outlets. Their loan portfolio increased by 32.5% to 3.4 billion 
Euros, while their deposits only grew by 20.7% to 2.2 billion Euros. This development 
is not in line with the group’s strategy to increase customer deposits. The subsidiary’s 
cost to income ratio improved from 53.2% to 47.4% in 2008, indicating an increase in 
efficiency.219  
 
In Romania Raiffeisen is the third largest bank on the market. In 2008 they had 6,899 
employees serving approximately 2 million customers through 557 business outlets. 
The loan to deposits ratio did not develop favorably. While the deposits remained at 
3.5 billion Euros, the loan portfolio grew by 30.1% to 4.6 billion Euros. The cost to  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income ratio improved to 53.3% during the period, which reflects the strong 
centralization of all business processes.220 
 
The CIS region, despite facing many problems at the time, had the largest increase 
in profit before tax (+50%). With 665 million Euros it became the biggest contributor 
on the earnings side.221 A large part of this development was caused by the 
enormous increase of 41% in net interest income reaching 1,297 million Euros in 
2008. In addition the net fee and commission income as well as the net trading 
income grew by 64 million and 47 million Euros respectively. Unfortunately the 
provisioning for impairment losses also doubled to 356 million Euros in 2008. The 
general administrative expenses rose by 23% to 853 million Euros. Nevertheless the 
cost to income ratio improved significantly by 6.5% to 45.1% in 2008.222 
 
In the Ukraine, Raiffeisen Bank Aval as of the end of 2008 was the second biggest 
bank of the country. With 17,368 employees they were serving more than 4.7 million 
customers through 1,134 outlets. The loan to deposit ratio unfortunately increased in 
the country. While the loan portfolio was still increasing by 2.7% to 5.3 billion Euros, 
the deposits declined by 20.6% to 2.4 billion Euros. As a consequence Raiffeisen has 
begun strong cost cutting efforts in the country. On the top of their list of cost 
reductions stands the large number of employees, which got reduced by 412 in 2008 
and will most likely be reduced further.223  
4.4 – Vienna Insurance Group 
4.4.1 – Overview & Strategy 
Vienna Insurance Group (VIG), is Austria’s biggest insurance company in terms of 
total premium, and has the largest involvement in the CEE area. It is currently 
operating in 23 countries, out of which six are under the review of the thesis (see 
Figure 1). Additionally all subsidiaries, except for Hungary, are part of the top 3 
insurers in their country. 
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Figure 1224 
Figure 2 shows that VIG managed to increase its premium volume by 14.3% to 
7,898.87 million Euros in 2008. This suggests that the growth opportunities in the 
unsaturated economies of the CEE markets are easing the effects of the crisis. 
Currently VIG generates around 50% of its premiums in the CEE region. It 
contributed 61.7% of the non-life segment, and 38.9% of the life insurance 
segment.225 The organic growth realized from the acquisition of the insurance part of 
Erste Bank226 and thereby also securing an additional distribution channel, is 
threatened by the high volatility of the markets and their currencies.227 This threat 
causes the management of the VIG Group not to be able to make a forecast for the 
year 2009.228  
 
Figure 2229    
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Due to the financial crisis, VIG had to drastically reduce their expenses. In the 
beginning of March 2009, their CEO announced a cost reduction program of 100 
million Euros. These reductions will primarily reduce the number of employees. 
Additionally they will manage to reduce costs by consolidating the IT Terminals in 
Poland, Rumania and Slovakia.230 VIG is currently facing increasing costs. The 
expenses for insurance claims increased by 11.4%, and the operating expenses by 
16.1% compared to 2007. However it is more important whether these increases in 
costs caused by growth, are smaller than the growth in premium income. VIG as a 
matter of fact has increased their profit before taxes by 23.7%, to 540.8 million Euros. 
This however was influenced by extra income generated from the sale of Unita to 
Uniqa in Romania. In total it shows that the Group’s strategy of keeping each 
individual daughter company under a combined ratio of 100% is successful. Currently 
the group’s combined ratio is at 96.4%.231 
 
VIG has been actively engaged in the CEE region for many years. They had a first 
mover advantage, but they were also the first to face the difficulties resulting from a 
formerly centrally planned economy.232 They managed to overcome these difficulties, 
and successfully become the leader of their core markets as you can tell from Figure 
1 in the previous chapter. 
 
The first product segment that became important for VIG In the CEE region was 
motor vehicle insurance. Due to the European standard that motor vehicle liability 
insurance is mandatory this segment proves to be relatively crisis resistant, since 
people tend to not want to give up their mobility. After they became a major motor-
vehicle insurer in the region, VIG focused on life insurance, since this is the area with 
the most growth potential in the region. One reason for this high potential is the low 
average insurance density in the countries at the moment compared to the EU-15 
countries as you can tell from Figure 3.233  
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Figure 3234 
People from this region are more concerned about reserves for retirement than in 
western countries, since the local governments in most cases cannot provide 
financial safety. However this trend only becomes important with additional income, 
and therefore growth could be offset by the financial crisis. VIG has recently 
announced that they want to start offering private health insurance in the CEE region, 
and thereby becoming a first mover in a segment they consider as being very 
important in the future.235 Another initiative from VIG was to incorporate their 
knowledge about the region in a reinsurance company. By 2009, VIG Re has already 
managed to reach their premium targets of 2011, which is yet another sign of the 
specialist position VIG has within the region.236 
4.4.2 – Region 
In the Czech Republic VIG is the second largest insurer with a market share of 
31.4%. Due to the acquisition of s-Versicherung they also became a leading insurer 
in the life insurance segment with a market share of 27.4% in 2008.237 In total VIG 
owns two composite insurers, and one insurance focusing on the life segment. Out of 
these companies, Kooperativa is the most important as it is the largest insurance 
company held outside of Austria. They offer their life insurance products through a 
close cooperation with Ceska Sporitelna, which has more than five million clients. 
Additionally they also started to sell their products via telephone, in addition to  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internet sales.238 The business development for VIG during 2008 was positive 
concerning the current problems. Their premium volume increased by 25.6%, which 
was highly influenced by the life insurance segment. It increased by 49.5%, in 
comparison to an increase of 17.3% in the non-life segment. The group managed to 
increase their profit before taxes by 45.6% to 107.45 million Euros. The combined 
ratio of the group’s operations in the Czech Republic was reduced by 1.5 percent, 
and now stands far below the 100% barrier at 92.2%.239 
 
In Slovakia VIG was the second largest insurance company in 2008 with a market 
share of 31.3%. They were both the leading life, and motor-vehicle insurer of the 
country.240  VIG owns one composite, one non-life, and three life insurance 
companies. The firm in the non-life segment is the third biggest motor-vehicle insurer. 
This strengthens the core product segment that is covered by VIG in the CEE region 
so far. The successful development of the life insurance segment was partially 
caused by the multi channel distribution system. These channels cover everything 
from brokers, agents and a bancassurance partnership with the largest bank of the 
country. This gives VIG access to 2.5 million potential clients.241 As for the financial 
facts the total premiums in Slovakia increased by 22.5% in 2008, which was 
influenced by the large increase in life insurance (+39.2%). The non-life segment is 
more saturated, and therefore only was increased by 11.3%. The operating expenses 
increased by 14.7%, which is considerably lower than the increase in premium. 
However the expenses for insurance claims were very high in 2008 due to the 
conversion process of the formerly state owned monopoly insurer. Due to this fact, 
and the difficult situation on the capital markets, the companies operating for VIG in 
Slovakia decreased their profit before taxes by 83.5% to 4.99 million Euros. The 
combined ratio for the country still is below the barrier of 100%, but increased to 
93.3% in 2008 in comparison to 92.9% in 2007.242 
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Even though VIG had to sell UNITA to Uniqa, they managed to increase their leading 
position on the Romanian market with a market share of 30.6% in 2008. Benefiting 
from the organic growth caused by the acquisition of s-Versicherung they became 
one of the Top 3 life insurers of the country. They sustained their market leadership 
in their core segment motor-vehicle insurance with a market share of 35.4%.243 
Currently they are in control of three composite insurers: Omniasig, Asirom and BCR. 
The first two are the largest motor vehicle insurers of the country. The non-life 
products are offered through direct sales, agents and brokers. Life insurance 
products are also sold through agents, but since the opening of the life insurance 
branch of BCR, a bancassurance arrangement also came into play.244 VIG Romania 
managed to increase its premiums by 47.1% in 2008, which is influenced by the 
increase in the non-life segment (+42.3%). Even though the increase in the life 
insurance business was much greater (+187.1%) it only contributes a small part in 
terms of total premiums (∼6%).  The premium growth caused an increase in 
operating expenses and expenses for insurance claims of 89.7% and 50.6% 
respectively. The profits before taxes of the group’s operations were highly 
influenced by the sale of Unita, and therefore were increased by 52.9 million Euros to 
57.46 million Euros in 2008. Problems in the country are indicated by the 4.7% 
increase in the combined ratio. This puts Romania above the 100% barrier at 104.7% 
in 2008.245 
 
VIG plays a dominant role on the Bulgarian insurance market. In 2008 they reached 
a total market share of 17.9%.246 The group currently owns four composite insurers 
with both life and non-life operations. The biggest out of which is Bulstrad non-life, 
which in 2008 was the largest insurance company of the country.247 
 
In the Ukraine, VIG currently is part of the top 3 companies operating on the 
insurance market.  This was primarily reached through the acquisition of UIG in  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2007.248 VIG Ukraine currently is controlling four insurance companies. Three of 
these companies primary goal is to strengthen VIG’s market position in the motor-
vehicle segment. Jupiter is the only life insurance operation in the Ukraine, which 
cooperates with Erste Bank as a bancassurance distribution partner.249 
 
In Hungary, VIG does not play a large role in comparison to other CEE countries. 
Currently it is the eighth biggest insurance company on the market, and therefore far 
off from the top 5 status the company normally seeks.250 Currently VIG runs the 
composite insurer Union, and the recently acquired Hungarian Erste life insurance 
branch ESB. The products of ESB are distributed through a bancassurance 
agreement with Erste Bank.251 
 
Since Bulgaria, Hungary and the Ukraine are not part of the VIG core markets the 
group did not publish the business development separately for each country. 
Classified as other CEE countries they increased their total premiums by 29.3% in 
2008, which was influenced by the increase in non-life insurance. The premiums 
grew in non-life and life insurance 33.1% and 21.6% respectively. This stands in 
contrary to the general development of the region, where the growth is often more 
influenced by the life insurance segment. Even though the expenses for insurance 
claims and the operating expenses only rose by 27.6% and 19.5% respectively the 
group still suffered a loss of 14.41 million Euros in 2008.  This was largely due to the 
deteriorating situation of these markets. It is also reflected by the combined ratio of 
105.8%, which is considerably above the group target of 100%.252 
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4.5 – Uniqa 
4.5.1 – Overview & Strategy 
Uniqa is Austria’s second biggest insurance company in terms of total Premiums. As 
a composite insurance group they offer non-life, life and health insurance products to 
the public. In recent years Uniqa has taken product innovation as one of their goals. 
With products like “safe-line” auto insurance where the driver can “click” for help in 
case of an accident, they tried to distinguish themselves from the classic and dull 
insurance products offered by the competition.  Within this section the reader will get 
an overview of their current situation, their market activities in the pre-specified 
region, and their strategy in eastern and southeastern Europe.  
 
Figure 1253 
 
Uniqa currently operates in 20 markets throughout Europe (see Figure 1) with a total 
Premium volume of 5.8 billion Euros. Eastern Europe plays a very important role in 
the strategy of Uniqa. The subsidiaries in the region provide 22% of the total 
premiums, and the plan is that one-day Eastern Europe and the other international 
subsidiaries should provide more than half of the premium volume.254 Additionally 
their goal is to increase their market shares in their non-life and life insurance 
companies to 6% and 3% respectively. One factor that will continue to help them 
develop in the underdeveloped insurance markets of Eastern Europe is the preferred  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partnership with Raiffeisen International. This bancassurance agreement currently 
covers 13 countries in the region, and is hence supposed to give both participants a 
chance to achieve above average growth ratios.255 Uniqa additionally receives 
support from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This support 
grew from 70 million Euros in 2007 to 150 million in 2008, and is therefore an 
important factor in the growth strategy for the CEE region.256  
 
Despite the difficulties in 2008 Uniqa managed to increase its total premiums by 
10.4%, which was highly influenced by the growth in the Eastern European 
subsidiaries (+56.7%). Despite the large growth rates the forecasts for the medium 
term have been postponed due to the increasingly more difficult situation on the 
financial markets.257 However with the third profit improvement program running out 
in 2010, Uniqa will be able to lower its cost ratios, compress structures, eliminate 
redundant work and save resources through outsourcing.258 
 
As already mentioned the premiums grew by 10.4% in 2008. When broken up into 
life and non-life insurance, their premiums where split up into 41.2% non-life 
insurance (2007: 41.7%), 42.5% life insurance (2007: 41.1%) and 16.3% health 
insurance business (2007: 17.2%). There was a slight movement from health 
insurance towards life insurance, but overall the balance was similar to 2007. More 
importantly Eastern Europe was responsible for 22% of the total group premiums.  
Nevertheless the operating expenses draw a bit of a different picture. These grew by 
17.2% in 2008 reaching 1,237 million Euros. Then additionally the group had to cover 
higher acquisition costs (+6.7%), and other operating expenses. In total this 
increased their cost ratio, which compares total expenses with the premiums earned, 
from 22% to 22.5% in 2008.259  
 
The crisis manifested itself the strongest in investments. Even though the total 
investments decreased only slightly by 0.9% to 21,342 million Euros, the net income 
from these investments reduced drastically by 80.2% from 955 million Euros in 2007 
to 189 million in 2008. This also had a direct effect on the profit on ordinary activities                                                         
255 Uniqa Group Annual Report 2008, pg. 6 
256 Uniqa Group Annual Report 2008, pg. 7 
257 Uniqa Group Annual Report 2008, pg. 4 
258 Uniqa Group Annual Report 2008, pg. 7 
259 Uniqa Group Annual Report 2008, pg. 37 
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which was set back to 90 million Euros from 340 million in 2007. Additionally the 
worsened economic situation also caused a decline of the cash flow on ordinary 
activities to 267 million Euros from 846 in 2007. Despite all these negative figures the 
group has managed to keep total equity at 1,459 million Euros, which is mere 
reduction of 73 million to 2007.260 
 
The non-life segment was developing favorably in the difficult environment of 2008. 
The premiums increased by 9.3% to 2,401 million Euros, which was influenced by 
the above average increase in premiums from Eastern Europe (+33.1%). The 
Eastern European operations already contribute 29.2% of the total premiums earned 
in this segment (see Figure 2). Uniqa is an insurance company with an international 
focus, which is best represented by the fact that 46.1% of the premiums earned in 
this segment in 2008 came from international subsidiaries. Additionally the retained 
insurance benefits increased by 12.8%, which is large in comparison to the increase 
in premiums. Operating expenses in this segment rose by 22.6% causing the cost 
ratio to rise to 33.4% from 32.6% in 2007. The net income from investments at -
83.7%, was above the total average reduction mentioned earlier. This ultimately led 
to a reduction in profit on ordinary activities from the non-life segment to 113 million 
Euros in comparison to 238 million in 2007. 261 
      
Figure 2262         Figure3263 
The life insurance operations of Uniqa were expanding during 2008. The total 
premium volume grew by 14.1% to 2,476 million Euros.264 The premiums of the 
Eastern European subsidiaries have doubled, and already contribute 23% to the total  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life insurance premiums. This is lower than the figure in non-life insurance, but the 
growth rates are much larger in this segment (see Figure 3). This can be explained 
by the fact that a lot of Eastern European economies are still lacking behind in life 
insurance penetration. Unfortunately this insurance segment has shown to be more 
problematic during difficult times. Retained insurance benefits decreased by 13.5% in 
total, but in the CEE markets they grew by 325.5% due to the growth in premiums. 
Operating expenses on the other hand have also grown by 13.1%, as well as 
acquisition expenses (+9.2%), and other operating expenses (+30.8%). However due 
to the growth in premiums, the cost ratio of this segment remains at 15.5%, which is 
a slight decrease in comparison to 2007 (-0.2%). Net income on investments 
decreased by 76.4% to 133 million Euros, which is a bit below the total average of 
80.2%. Nevertheless there was a loss of 27 million Euros in this segment in 
comparison to a profit of 5 million Euros in 2007.265 
4.5.2 – Region 
As for the region under review by this thesis Uniqa is operating in all of the chosen 
markets. In Bulgaria Uniqa has control over one life and one non-life insurance 
company. The non-life company currently is the 6th largest on the market, and offers 
all lines of non-life insurance products.266 The life insurance company is the 5th 
largest on the market, and offers the full range of life insurance products.267 Both 
companies offer their products through a countrywide sales network of employees 
and agents. 
 
In Slovakia the group has control over the composite insurer Uniqa poistovna. It is 
one of the leading insurance companies on the market and offers all types of life and 
non-life insurance products through a countrywide network of offices, agents, brokers 
and car dealers. However even though all type of products are offered the focus 
remains on motor and life insurance.268 The Czech subsidiary runs under the same 
name and principle. It acts as a composite insurer, and is currently one of the top 10 
insurance companies on the market. The products are also offered through a similar 
sales network.269                                                         
265 Uniqa Group Annual Report 2008, pg. 41 
266http://www.uniqagroup.com/uniqagroup/cms/eng/group/group_companies/uniqa_insurance_plc.jsp 
267http://www.uniqagroup.com/uniqagroup/cms/eng/group/group_companies/uniqa_life_insurance_plc.
jsp 
268http://www.uniqagroup.com/uniqagroup/cms/eng/group/group_companies/uniqa_poistovna.jsp 
269http://www.uniqagroup.com/uniqagroup/cms/eng/group/group_companies/uniqa_pojistovna.jsp 
  69 
 
The Hungarian subsidiary has been part of the group since 2003. It is currently the 
sixth largest insurance company on the market. As a composite insurer it offers all 
types of non-life and life insurance products through a sales network of more than 
850 agents.270 
 
The acquisition of UNITA insurance in Romania has been a large step in the 
prospectus Romanian market. It is currently the 6th largest property insurer with a 
market share of 7.1%. Hence with this acquisition Uniqa has already met the target 
market share for markets in this region. The company has roughly 950 employees, 
and is offering their products to approximately 250,000 customers through a network 
of agents, branch offices and brokers.271 
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5 – Empirical Analysis  
 
In order to provide the necessary information to value the stated hypotheses several 
interviews where conducted. The people interviewed where all managing officers, or 
have just recently retired, and hence have large insight into the firms operation 
throughout the reviewed region. In total there were five interviews. Two interviews 
were conducted with representatives from the banking industry (UniCredit Bank 
Austria and Raiffeisen International), as well as two interviews with representatives 
from the insurance industry (VIG and Uniqa). In order for the empirical analysis not to 
be biased towards the view of the private sector, an interview with an official from the 
Austrian National Bank was also conducted. By adding the view of the regulators, the 
analysis paints a more realistic picture. 
 
Due to the fact that the financial crisis still has strong effects on the world markets, 
and in order to get better answers, the people interviewed where made anonymous 
in order to be able to guarantee that no negative effects would be brought on them. 
For the further analysis I will use the following names for the interview partners: 
• Mr. Smith – UniCredit Bank Austria, recently retired 
• Mr. Jones – Raiffeisen International 
• Mr. Brooks – VIG 
• Mr. Terry   – Uniqa 
• Mr. Charles– Austrian National Bank 
 
In order to get good results the interview was conducted through open questions in 
order to give the people interviewed the possibility to give a complete picture of their 
firm’s current situation. This way they were able to express different factors 
influencing their situation, which are impossible to put into numbers. It also gave the 
interview partners a possibility to add a different perspective not intended by the 
interviewer. 
 
The questionnaire on, which the interviews were based on, was in German. Even 
though this was not essential, since all people interviewed are perfectly capable to 
hold an interview in English, it was done this way to make the interviewed as 
comfortable as possible. All interviews where held in Vienna between October 2009 
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and January 2010, and took from 30 to 60 minutes. Due to the length of these 
interviews, a transcript would have outdone the length of the thesis itself. For this 
reason the recorded interviews were only transferred into key points by the 
interviewer. The German questionnaire reads as follows (translated into English 
below): 
Interviewleitfaden  
Region / Umfeld 
 
1. Wie wird sich ihrer Meinung nach das Umfeld der österreichischen Banken 
und Versicherungen in der Region Osteuropa in den nächsten 3 bis 5 Jahren 
entwickeln?  
2. Wie stehen sie zu der Auffassung, dass Finanzdienstleister die sich primär auf 
Osteuropa konzentrieren in Zukunft auf Grund der Finanz- und 
Realwirtschaftskrise in Turbulenzen geraten könnten? 
3. In welchen osteuropäischen Ländern sehen sie stärkere Wachstumschancen? 
4. Gibt es ihrer Meinung nach Länder die sich bereits an die Werte Westeuropas 
annähern? Ist es für diese bereits weitentwickelten osteuropäischen Länder 
möglich, die Werte auch während und nach der Finanzkrise zu halten? 
5. In welchen Regionen sehen sie in den nächsten 24 Monaten auf Grund der 
Finanz- und Realwirtschaftskrise eine große Gefahr eines 
Wachstumseinbruchs, welcher nicht Währungsbedingt ist? Gibt es Segmente 
die besonders von der Krise getroffen sind? 
 
 
Eigenkapital 
 
6. Welche Eigenkapitalquoten in Relation zu den gesetzlichen 
Minimalerfordernissen empfinden sie als notwendig um über dem Durchschnitt 
des Marktes in Osteuropa zu wachsen? 
7. In wieweit könnten sich die gesetzlichen Eigenkapitalerfordernisse in der 
Zukunft ändern? 
8. Sehen sie in den nächsten 24 Monaten auf Grund der Realwirtschaftskrise 
eine weitere Welle an Staats bzw. Entwicklungshilfen um entweder die 
Finanzwelt der Region zu stützen bzw. die Unternehmen die darin tätig sind? 
 
Kosten 
 
9.  In welchen Märkten und Bereichen sehen sie das größte Potential an 
Kosteneinsparungen für ihr Unternehmen(z.B. Personal, IT, Vertrieb, 
Administration, Synergien)? Könnten sich diese auch auf den 
Handlungsspielraum ihres Unternehmens auswirken? 
 
Markt & Marktposition 
 
10. In welchen Märkten sehen sie Gefahren, dass die gewonnene Marktposition 
der österreichischen Banken und Versicherungen in Osteuropa im heutigen 
Ausmaß nicht gehalten werden kann?  
72 
11. Sehen sie in einem 5 Jahreszeitraum in dieser Region eine konkrete Chance 
die Marktposition zu erweitern?  
 
Regulierung 
 
12. Sehen sie mit den neuen Eigenkapital Vorschriften (Basel 2 / Solvency 2) eine 
stärkere lokale bzw. europaweite Regulierungswelle in Folge der Krise? 
13. Wird ihrer Meinung nach in Zukunft stärker reguliert werden oder wird sich mit 
dem Abklingen der Krise auch das Niveau der Regulierung auf dem heutigen 
Level einpendeln? 
14. In wiefern halten sie eine Umstrukturierung der europäischen Finanz-
Regulierungsbehörden für notwendig um einheitliche Spielverhältnisse für alle 
Marktteilnehmer zu schaffen, und zukünftige Krisen zu vermeiden?  
 
It is divided into the following five sections to be able to provide the information 
necessary to test the stated hypotheses: 
• Region (H1 / H2) 
1. How will the surrounding of the Austrian Banks and Insurance 
companies in the Eastern- European region evolve in the next 3 to 
5 years? 
2. Do you believe that Banks or Insurance companies that are 
currently concentrating on the Eastern-European market are going 
to face turbulences due to the financial and real- economy crisis? 
3. Which countries currently provide strong growth potential? 
4. In your opinion, are there any countries already getting close to 
western values? Will these countries be able to maintain that 
position throughout the crisis? 
5. Do you see a region where there might be another non-currency 
related turmoil in the next two years that is related to the financial 
or real economy crisis? Are any segments especially hurt due to 
the crisis? 
• Equity (H3) 
6. How much Equity will be necessary in comparison to the 
regulatory minimums to grow above the market? 
7. How will the equity requirements adapt in the future? 
8. Are there going to be any more rescue packages during the next 
24 Months to either stabilize the financial markets or bail out 
important companies? 
• Cost (H3) 
9. In which market and company segments do you see the greatest 
cost-cutting potential (i.e. HR, IT, Sales, Administration, 
Synergies)? Could this cost cutting also influence the flexibility of 
your firm? 
• Market Position (H4) 
10. Do you currently see the dominant market position of the Austrian 
financial service industry at risk in Eastern Europe? 
11. Do you see an opportunity to enlarge your market position in the 
region during the next five years? 
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• Regulation (H5) 
12. Concerning the new requirements that have to be met by banks 
and insurers (Basel 2/Solvency 2) do you see more local or 
Europe-wide regulation due to the crisis? 
13. Do you believe that in the future there will be a general trend 
towards stricter regulation, or will this trend ease again once the 
current crisis is in the past? 
14. Do you think that the European regulatory system has to be 
reformed in order to create a “unified codex” which applies to all 
market players, and do you think that future crisis scenarios can 
be prevented this way? 
 
In the following analysis of the answers provided by the interview partners, the 
questions and answers where translated into English. This will be followed by a 
summary of the results for the individual questions. 
5.1 – Interviews   
1. How will the surrounding of the Austrian Banks and Insurance companies 
in the Eastern- European region evolve in the next 3 to 5 years? 
 
Mr. Smith from UniCredit Bank Austria replied that the most important thing to keep 
in mind is that this is not a homogeneous region. Each country has different 
problems, and is at different levels in their development. While the next barrier for 
some countries is the Euro, other countries have not even entered the European 
Union. When for example comparing the ratio of bank assets to the GDP, you can 
still see enormous potential in the region due to a very low bank penetration. The 
actions of the ECB and the FED resolved the liquidity crisis, which was a huge 
problem in the second half of 2008. However, he believes that the biggest write-
down’s for the institutions are still coming up in 2010 and 2011. The rising 
unemployment rate is another worry in his eyes.  
 
From Mr. Jones’ perspective the problem is very similar to Mr. Smith’s view. He also 
believes that the most important fact is that the region is not homogeneous. Some 
countries have problems, while others are doing well.  Some economies would have 
also been hit hard despite the crisis. The Ukraine for example is a political nightmare, 
with a lot of corruption. Hungary was also hit hard, however their problems also do 
not stem from the crisis, but rather from the soaring deficit. Other countries like the 
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Czech Republic and Slovakia are doing very well, and our subsidiaries have only 
showed a small decrease in profits. Although these countries are also going to do 
well in the future, he believes that there might be a time lag in the NPL ratio. For this 
reason he also states that the pre crisis levels will only become possible again three 
to five years from now. However at that point the growth in the region will be stronger 
than anywhere else in Western Europe. 
 
Mr. Brooks from the Vienna Insurance Group suggested that during 2010 and 2011 
all countries of Eastern Europe (although Western-Europe is going to have similar 
issues) are going to have problems resulting from high unemployment rates. He 
believes that some factors are going to improve in individual countries, but not 
region-wide. He sees this situation as an opportunity for the Austrian Financial 
Service Industry to improve their situation through good customer relationships. 
 
Mr. Terry states that the markets in the CEE region during the next three years are 
going to be catching up quicker to pre-crisis levels than most western economies. In 
eastern and southeastern Europe the growth will depend on the debt situation of 
each economy, since large debt burdens also result in restricting public spending and 
also slow down growth. Growth will also largely depend on foreign investment from 
the West, since the state will not be able to provide the capital without having to fear 
large restrictions by the IMF. Mr. Terry sees this conflict in a lot of economies in the 
region as for example the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. 
 
Mr. Charles from the Austrian National Bank says that in the second half of 2008 the 
situation was very critical, and that everybody was fantasizing about how the modern 
financial system is going to collapse. Almost all of the analysts made the mistake of 
thinking of Eastern Europe as a homogeneous region. The only thing that unites this 
region, the national bank representative says, is that geographically seen it lies east 
of us, and not even that is true when looking at Prague. Throughout all countries 
there are major differences in the political systems, the economic stability and stage 
of development. He believes that despite all the bad media, the region will remain the 
growth source of Europe in the long term. After all there is catch up potential in all 
financial indicators. He believes that the Austrian banks and insurance companies 
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have a long-term commitment to the region, and that this will also bring them 
sufficient growth in the future.  
2. Do you believe that Banks or Insurance companies that are currently 
concentrating on the Eastern-European market are going to face 
turbulences due to the financial and real- economy crisis? 
 
Mr. Smith actually believes that the opposite is the case. He states that even though 
Eastern Europe has definitely felt the consequences of the financial crisis, there is 
still enormous growth potential in the markets when compared to Western Europe. 
He also says that these countries are more used to dealing with crisis situations than 
any other region. The people are easily motivated even in rough times, which in part 
is a consequence of the enormous catch up potential. 
 
The Raiffeisen representative believes that to a certain degree all banks are facing 
problems, and that this is not limited to Austrian banks. Also it depends on how a 
problem is defined, since Raiffeisen International up to date has never recorded a 
loss neither annually nor quarterly. During the liquidity crisis immediately after the 
Lehman Brothers collapse, Raiffeisen was having difficulties like everyone else. He 
also states that if banks default it is mostly due to liquidity reasons, and not due to 
lacking capital. Eastern Europe has felt the effects of the financial crisis more than 
any other emerging market, and therefore will also most likely take the longest to 
recover. However he believes that the region still has enormous catch up potential, 
and growth opportunities in the long run.  
 
Mr. Brooks believes that all the concerns about the Austrian financial service industry 
and its involvement in the CEE region also have an economic background from 
speculators. When comparing Eastern Europe with Western Europe it is clear that 
the West has bigger problems. Off course the situation is not easy to manage, but 
relatively speaking they are better off. Especially when taking into account, that the 
region is far behind in its economical development in comparison to Western Europe. 
It is important to keep in mind that this region did not get the western banking system 
into trouble, but rather the other way around. When only looking at the insurance 
industry everything seems to be pretty calm at the moment. The only country where 
there are problems are in the Ukraine, but that is the same for all other providers of 
financial services. 
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Mr. Terry says that especially during the beginning of the financial crisis, the media 
switched their impression of the involvement of the Austrian financial service industry 
from what was at first considered as enormous potential in Eastern Europe into 
massive negative exposure in the region. Large investors nowadays tend to act more 
rapidly after negative press statements especially in the U.S., and this might have 
also been one reason for the over-reaction of the market. However he also mentions, 
that once new entry possibilities at a reasonable price open up these investors will 
also re-enter these markets relatively quickly. Additionally he mentions that in general 
the entire situation is more of a banking than an insurance problem, as for instance in 
the case of foreign currency loans denominated in Swiss Franks that have caused a 
lot of problems for Austrian banks. For the insurance industry this crisis also results 
in lower growth rates, but these will pick up once the situation recovers. 
 
Mr. Charles thinks that currently the involvement of the financial institutions is seen 
as a risk, whereas in the past it was considered an advantage, but he believes that 
the media in most cases only tells half the story. Actually the Austrian Banks are 
highly diversified throughout the region, which should be considered an advantage 
according to portfolio theory. Swedish banks for example only got involved in the 
Baltic states, and are now facing much larger problems due to the lack in 
diversification. Additionally Austrian Banks have specialized on the classic banking 
business, which does not stem that much risk.  
 
3. Which countries currently provide strong growth potential? 
 
Mr. Smith believes that in general there is still a lot of growth potential in the entire 
region. Currently there are countries that are more problematic, as for example 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Ukraine. However these economies will also 
grow again when the crisis is over, and then most likely at a much faster pace than 
Western Europe.  
 
Mr. Jones also believes that due to the transformation process there is strong growth 
potential in the entire region, but investments from abroad will remain necessary.  
The large volatility in the markets will also remain in the near future. When taking the 
historical context of the region into account and comparing it to Western Europe this 
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also seems logical. After World War 2, the Western European nations also where 
only able to prosper due to the enormous investment from the US, and the last war in 
the Balkans was only in 1999. Another issue that Mr. Jones wanted to express was 
that in the future it will be more important for Raiffeisen to serve their current 
customer base with more products rather than gaining additional market share. Such 
“wide” customers are also more profitable to the bank, and it is also easier to 
determine their risk. 
 
The VIG representative believes that there is enormous growth potential in all 
countries of the region. He mentions that when you compare the insurance density of 
for instance Bulgaria with Austria you can tell the enormous difference. In Bulgaria 
the current insurance density is 168 USD per year, whereas in Austria the value is at 
approximately 3000 USD per year. And that is by far not the end of the scale. Due to 
this comparison he believes that strong growth is to be expected in the future. The 
countries have been disturbed in their growth pattern due to the crisis, but when it is 
over the growth will be far above average. The insurance industry similarly got halted 
in its growth. It will take a bit longer, but the growth pattern will continue. However the 
situation will be different from country to country. 
 
Mr. Terry also shares the believe that in the medium to long run all countries of the 
region have enormous potential due to the lack in insurance penetration. He believes 
that from the countries under review by this thesis the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
are the most attractive markets.  
 
Similarly to all other interview partners, Mr. Charles from the Austrian National Bank 
also thinks that enormous growth opportunities remain in the entire region despite the 
crisis. He also again urges that the region is heterogeneous, and therefore everything 
will depend on the country. For some countries like the Ukraine and Romania, he 
believes that the political situation is very critical and could have an adverse effect on 
the growth of these economies. 
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4. In your opinion, are there any countries already getting close to western 
values? Will these countries be able to maintain that position throughout 
the crisis? 
 
The Bank Austria representative believes that especially the countries surrounding 
Austria, except for Hungary, are in a good position. Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
are in comparison to other countries in the region relatively close to western 
standards, and this will also stay that way throughout the crisis. In Slovakia there 
unfortunately is one factor that might still disturb this picture, and that is the high 
influence of the automotive industry on the GDP. If the automotive industry has 
problems recovering from the recession, this might also put pressure on the Slovak 
economy. 
 
Mr. Jones smiled when asked this question, and stated that even though some 
countries got through the crisis quite well there is still a lot of catch up potential when 
looking at Western Europe. This growth potential is also the reason why they focused 
their operations on this region. 
 
The VIG representative believes that from the countries under review, the Czech 
Republic is furthest along. However their insurance density is also just one fifth of 
Austria, hence there still is a lot of growth potential. In the insurance industry, Mr. 
Brook states, there is something similar to Maslow’s pyramid. In this case the lowest 
layer are non-life insurance products, as for example motor-vehicle insurance. The 
following level is related to unfortunate personal situations, as for example accident 
insurance. The last layer of the “insurance pyramid”, are insurance types like life, 
health and pension plans. These products are aimed at clients that are planning 
ahead financially. Eastern Europe is still at the first stage of that pyramid, and 
therefore still has a long way to go. 
 
Mr. Terry states that even though some countries have gotten closer to Western 
standards they still remain behind. From his opinion the Czech Republic is the 
furthest along. They currently have a good mix between living standard and national 
debt, which gives them an advantage to other countries in the region like Hungary. 
Other than that he also believes that Slovakia has developed fairly well. However 
similarly to the UniCredit representative he also sees the enormous dependence 
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from investments in the automotive industry. The country has a big advantage due to 
the introduction of the Euro, since it is not the target of currency speculations, but if 
the investments in the auto industry slow down significantly compared to pre-crisis 
levels it could cause difficulties.  
 
5. Do you see a region where there might be another non-currency related 
turmoil in the next two years that is related to the financial or real economy 
crisis? Are any segments especially hurt due to the crisis? 
 
When asked this question Mr. Smith at first mentioned what would happen if the Euro 
was used as a “save haven” for weak economies. Slovakia is one example where the 
economy gained stability due to the introduction of the Euro. However the next 
extension of the Euro zone will take a while, since most countries in the current 
situation are far from being ready to introduce the Euro, and if they where to enter 
this would destabilize the entire union.  All segments of the bank will feel the 
pressure of credit defaults. One problematic product that was largely caused by 
Austrian institutions, are foreign currency loans, often denominated in Euros or Swiss 
Francs. Due to the large currency devaluations and increasing unemployment in the 
region the repayment of these types of loans became more and more difficult. Other 
segments currently facing problems are real estate loans and small to medium 
enterprises.  
 
Mr. Jones also sees some problems in almost all segments. The corporate and retail 
segments for example where hit really hard due to the crisis, while the treasury 
department was already doing well again in 2009. The retail segment was hurt 
specifically, since there are a lot of fix costs in this segment that cannot be reduced 
when difficulties come up. In general the business activity declined in many 
segments due to very low to no growth in interest income. He says that some 
products are hurt more than others. Foreign currency loans are a specific issue. Here 
the regulators from his perspective are playing the wrong cards, since this product is 
especially important for house builders. An adaption of the product according to him 
would make more sense. One example is that in the past these loans where 
classified due to their loan to value ratio, whereas other factors like the payment 
rates in comparison to the salary, or whether the person taking the loan also live in 
the house have higher influence on whether the loan is repaid.  
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Mr. Brooks believes that the situation is dependent on the individual countries and 
their governments. It depends whether the state aid has been enough to ensure a 
working market, and if budget deficits are going to indirectly constrain the growth 
through additional taxes for example. In general life insurance is going to be hurt 
more than non-life insurance, since this covers the basic needs of a growing 
economy as for example motor-vehicle insurance. Mr. Brooks also mentions some 
additional factors that might have a strong influence on the market. For instance 
during the crisis there were a lot of people that moved back home from abroad, and 
hence caused additional consumption. Since their reserves are getting less this might 
also cause a decline in the non-life segment. The Ukraine has often been in the 
media for facing a difficult situation, but this is a “bank-problem”, that is largely 
influenced by political instability. The insurance side of the market is also causing 
problems, but is comparatively less developed. 
 
From Mr. Terry’s perspective especially countries that have problems with their debt 
levels will face additional difficulties as for example restrictions by the IMF. Due to 
this the recovery in these markets will also take longer and become more difficult. 
However all the people of the region have had more crisis training than Western 
Europe, and therefore are also more stable in these types of situations. For the 
insurance industry the crisis has resulted in reduced growth in all segments. In non-
life insurance for instance the auto-insurance product showed lower growth due to 
the low number of new cars being bought. The life insurance segment was hit even 
harder, since people have a lower saving tendency due to the crisis. They currently 
need their money to survive rather than to save. The products most brutally hit are 
equity-linked life insurance policies, which show a strong correlation to the 
development of the stock indices and the disposable income of an economy, as well 
as the life insurance policies linked to credits. In this area the insurance industry is 
also dependent on credit growth, which is difficult when there is no liquidity on the 
market. Once this liquidity returns this product will also come back on a growth path. 
 
Mr. Charles mentions that 75% of the exposure of the Austrian banks is in EU 
member countries, and therefore relatively safe. However he once again mentions 
that some of the countries are politically unstable. Especially when two parties are 
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campaigning for an upcoming election, as in the case of the Ukraine, they often make 
populist statements. These statements in a very delicate situation like the current 
crisis, have an enormous effect on the markets and the payout schedule of the 
rescue packages. In such times strong governments that are able to push forward 
the transformation process would be necessary. Unfortunately in a lot of countries in 
the region that is currently not the case.  
 
6. How much Equity will be necessary in comparison to the regulatory 
minimums to grow above the market? 
 
Mr. Smith said that Austrian banks currently have no problems with capital 
requirements, but the exact amount of equity that is necessary cannot be derived 
through an equation. It depends very much on the business branches of each 
institution. He believes that currently the core tier 1 ratio should be greater than 9%, 
which is the case for most of the competitors even if they used state capital to get to 
that level. Bank Austria in comparison did not take state money, which is the reason 
why their core tier 1 ratio currently only is at 7.7%. This will change when they 
receive 2 billion Euros from the capital expansion of their Italian parent company. Mr. 
Smith believes that those 9% are also just an assumption by the market, since most 
banks are currently trying to stay over that level in order to have a competitive 
advantage. In his eyes the impairment problem is going to be much bigger in the 
future. This is going to be the case for market members that bought firms very late, 
and at an expensive price. Since currently they are not able to remain within their 
budgets, they will eventually have to write down their participation in these 
subsidiaries. In total it is important not to have a certain amount of equity, but 
relatively more than the other market players. If that is not the case the company’s 
financing costs are going to rise, since they are going to be regarded as more risky 
than the competition. 
 
Mr. Jones has a slightly different perspective on this matter than the UniCredit Bank 
Austria representative. Mr. Jones says that there are currently a lot of discussions 
going on about the topic, and that many things are still unclear. He also believes that 
the core tier 1 ratio will rise, but he sees it between 6-7%, and that Raiffeisen 
International with its current core tier 1 ratio of 8% should be well off.  
 
82 
The VIG representative believes that the equity requirements set by the regulators 
will have to be met, but otherwise this should not be a concern. Solvency 2 on the 
other hand can become difficult for Austrian insurers, since it is highly influenced by 
the strategy of large international insurance companies. 
 
Mr. Terry similarly to the VIG representative states that the current system is actually 
fine, and he also forecasts possible threats to the Austrian insurance industry due to 
Solvency 2. He believes that this new regulation is an over-reaction from the 
regulators due to populist statements by politicians. Too many factors at the moment 
are still unclear to make assumptions about the future capital requirements. 
 
Mr. Charles thinks that it is important to distinguish between the regulatory 
requirements, and the expectations of the market. The regulatory requirements, 
especially the tier1 capital ratio will probably be increased. However it is much more 
important for the Austrian banks to have an equity ratio, which is higher than the 
competition. This way they would send out a positive signal to the capital markets, 
and thereby reduce their refinancing costs. 
 
7. How will the equity requirements adapt in the future? 
 
Mr. Smith believes that the equity requirements are going to rise in general, and that 
this increase will also remain throughout the crisis. He specifically believes that 
certain types of loans will have to be covered by different amounts of equity. For 
example he believes that when banks due business for their own books in the future 
it will have to be covered by 100% equity in order to shut down that part of the 
business. This would contain one of the reasons for the crisis, because if banks had 
not been able to trade for their own books, the high volumes would have not been 
possible. 
 
From Mr. Jones’ perspective several changes in the regulatory system will occur in 
the near future. The requested core tier 1 ratio will rise to somewhere between 6-8%. 
Another indicator that might become part of the regulation is the leverage ratio. 
However he believes that all these changes only make sense if they are done 
globally. If the system is only going to change on the European market, this would 
subsequently bring comparative advantages to the US and Asia. The real problem 
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from his perspective is not the over-regulated banking market, but the unregulated 
segments like the hedge fund market.  
 
Mr. Brooks believes that this factor is critical to the development of the entire 
insurance market. He believes that the requirements should not be adapted in a way, 
that only large multinational insurers are able to follow them. Everything is also very 
dependent on who conducts the analysis of the region. He believes that this is very 
critical, since outsiders taking the region under review have failed in the past.  One 
thing not to forget is the fact that many Eastern European countries have 
comparatively low debt ratios. Romania’s debt ratio for example is below 50%, while 
Austria’s currently is around 80%. 
 
The Uniqa representative sees harsh times ahead for the industry, since regulators 
are going to ask for more capital from the insurance companies even though their 
business volume has not changed. It is also hard for him to imagine where that 
additional capital should come from. He states that if the regulation changes as 
drastically as currently displayed there would be an additional demand for capital 
from banks and insurance companies of approximately 700 million Euros. The big 
question is where should that capital come from. The firms would be asking for huge 
amounts of additional capital without having expanded their business. For this reason 
the only way to be able to get that kind of capital in one step would be to sell far 
below value, and thereby probably harm the companies even more. From his 
perspective it would be necessary to base the capital requirements on the industry 
the company is in, and the business model, which varies a lot between banks and 
insurance companies. One way to make this process acceptable for the insurance 
industry would be to increase the time-span. Such an increase in capital base cannot 
be achieved over night in a small equity market like Europe. If the regulators would 
give insurance companies a time frame of five years, which is similar to an approach 
taken in the Swiss insurance industry, it would make the switch in regulation more 
reasonable. 
 
Mr. Charles currently sees a development towards higher equity requirements, but 
the details still remain unknown due to the large differences in the regulatory systems 
around the globe. Especially the differences between the US and European 
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accounting systems are hard to overcome. Mr. Charles also believes that by only 
increasing equity requirements, future crises cannot be prevented. According to him 
it would be important to split up certain banks that became to big, and therefore have 
large influence on the entire system. If these huge conglomerates where split up it 
would be easier to let one part of the firm file for bankruptcy in difficult times, instead 
of having to worry about the future of the entire conglomerate, and thereby in some 
cases even the stability of the entire system. 
 
8. Are there going to be any more rescue packages during the next 24 Months 
to either stabilize the financial markets or bail out important companies? 
 
Mr. Smith believes that the current rescue packages already took their effect to ease 
the situation, and that these should be sufficient. The trust has been rebuilt, and 
there is enough liquidity on the market. However the banks that took the bail out 
money will try to repay it quickly, since it is expensive in most cases. If the situation 
where to get worse, there is enough capital available from supranational institutions 
like the IMF. However he also sees the current situation as a missed opportunity for 
the EU. If there would have been a quick European solution, Europe could have 
manifested itself as crisis stable in comparison to the US. Even though all of the 
packages offered by the individual countries are similar, there are minor differences. 
For example he mentions his frustration that the Austrian participation capital model 
was continuously adapted. When Bank Austria wanted to file for the participation 
capital, the government suddenly wanted a conversion right, which it did not regard 
as necessary for the other banks. Mr. Smith believes that this was an advantage 
granted to the local banks. 
 
From the point of view of the Raiffeisen International representative there is of course 
the possibility that other rescue package will become necessary, however he also 
believes that due to the help provided by the EU and the IMF, the situation is 
relatively safe and no country will have to default. Currently the situation might turn 
out to be a W-type recession, and that therefore the adaption in the regulation, 
specifically concerning the core tier 1 ratio has to be done at the right time in order 
not to upset growth. Growth is the most important factor for getting out of a crisis, and 
comparatively has a much larger effect on the deficit than cutting down public 
spending. He mentions that for instance the big administrative reform in Austria, 
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which has been planned for more than 20 years, would bring the government 3 billion 
Euros, while 0.5% more growth would have the same result. Off course it is important 
to raise the equity requirements, also considering that it is a clear G-20 goal for 2012. 
The timing however is crucial, since it might end up in an artificial prolongation of the 
crisis. For that reason the time horizon of this process might have to be adapted. 
 
The VIG representative believes that increasing unemployment is going to be the 
major priority of Eastern European governments in the next two years. However he 
also believes that the current rescue packages are going to be enough to keep the 
markets stable, but the governments should be aware of the risks that come along 
with a high debt balance. The insurance industry itself will not need any state aid, as 
it has not done so far. 
 
Mr. Terry believes that in several economies further east than the CEE region with 
the exception of Hungary, some help packages might still be necessary. However 
this international help would also give the governments less flexibility, since they 
would have to follow strict rules given by the IMF.  Growth in countries like Romania, 
Hungary or the Ukraine will be more dependent on the capital from foreign investors. 
Unfortunately these investors will only return to the markets if there are reasonably 
priced acquisition possibilities, and that is currently not the case. Many that invested 
just before the crisis are currently not exiting with losses, but would rather wait for 
times to change.  
 
Mr. Charles believes that the current stimulus packages should be enough, since the 
risk appetite of the market members has already increased, and thereby caused a 
recovery. Unfortunately in times of a crisis a country can also have problems 
financing their debt, which is also partially due to the large stimulus packages. New 
rescue packages would also not be a problem according to Mr. Charles. He said that 
the IMF, similarly to the other super-national institutions, has bolstered up its capital 
base to withstand shocks like that. Even though it still remains a fragile situation, Mr. 
Charles believes that the current rescue packages and the commitment of the banks 
will be enough to stabilize the markets.  
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9. In which market and company segments do you see the greatest cost-
cutting potential (i.e. HR, IT, Sales, Administration, Synergies)? Could this 
cost cutting also influence the flexibility of your firm? 
 
Mr. Smith states that even though cost cutting is going to play a role in the future, 
Bank Austria will remain a universal bank in the Eastern European region offering 
products in all segments. The effects will however be felt in the outlet expansion 
program, which was put on hold until further notice. Originally the plan was to create 
1000 additional outlets in the region. Additionally the firm is currently reducing 
employees, especially in Eastern Europe. However even though it is necessary to cut 
costs in the current situation, Bank Austria still expects a positive result in the first six 
months of 2009.  
 
Cost cutting in the eyes of Mr. Jones currently is a very important topic. Raiffeisen 
International is trying to cut costs wherever it can. By keeping the costs below the 
budget constraint they were able to push the results during the last period. The 
biggest cost cutting measurements where in the retail segment, especially by 
decreasing the number of employees. For Mr. Jones’ the best example is the 
Ukrainian subsidiary. Raiffeisen International bought a former soviet bank, and 
naturally there were to many employees for the job that was done. This problem 
occurs in a lot of the former-communist countries, and hence the number of 
employees can be reduced without losing quality. In total Mr. Jones believes that the 
factors, which limit the possibilities of a bank are the market and capital rather than 
the areas where costs are currently cut. Hence the bank should not lose any flexibility 
due to cost cutting.  
 
Mr. Brooks states that the highest potential for cost cutting is in the administration. 
The firm is currently running a 100 million Euro cost-cutting program, that is focused 
on the improvement of back-office processes. However he does not believe that this 
is going to have any influence on the opportunities of the company.   
 
Mr. Terry sees the biggest cost cutting potential in the smaller markets in Eastern 
Europe. He believes that there is a lot of potential in the area of cross border services 
if focused on areas that are not highly populated. This centralization process of the 
rural areas cuts down a lot of back office costs for Uniqa. Additionally he mentions 
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that the population in these areas is also highly educated, and would work for 
relatively low wages if they were not forced to move to the West or other financial 
centers where living costs are significantly higher. Despite all these possibilities these 
cost-cutting programs do not work over night. The effort today is to switch fixed into 
variable costs in order to be able to react better in a crisis.  
 
10. Do you currently see the dominant market position of the Austrian financial 
service industry at risk in Eastern Europe? 
 
The Bank Austria representative said that due to relatively large barriers to entry the 
Austrian position in the region is pretty safe. They have gained significant market 
share, which will also remain due to synergy effects and the opening of new outlets. 
For Bank Austria he sees advantages in comparison to other Austrian Banks. For 
example they standardized the brand, and their IT operations to reduce costs, 
whereas Erste Bank for example does not have a unified brand in Eastern Europe.  
 
Mr. Jones says that overall he believes the Austrian institutions will be able to hold 
their current market position in the region, but there are going to be some markets 
where that is not going to be the case. In Rumania and all countries surrounding 
Austria this should not be a problem, but specifically in the CIS region he sees some 
issues. He believes that if a bank where to concentrate on that specific region it 
would become a Russian bank, which could be a problem due to the enormous size 
of the market. Additionally this would result in an unbalanced portfolio, and in respect 
to the current crisis this could not be considered a positive development.  
 
The VIG representative believes that the market has already been divided, and 
therefore a new market entry will be difficult and expensive for outsiders. However 
with the current crisis it is possible. From his perspective the market position of the 
Austrian companies in the region will not change drastically due to the crisis.  
 
Mr. Terry similarly to the other interview partners believes that the market position in 
Eastern Europe is not going to change. He thinks that unless Western European or 
U.S. funds take a stake in an Austrian holding company, as in the case of Bank 
Austria, the situation is going to remain unchanged. That currently seems unlikely, 
but if the crisis bloats up for a second time or the equity expectations from the 
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regulators continue to rise, the situation could become more critical. Nevertheless 
with the current expectations of a recovery this should not become an issue.   
 
Mr. Charles also shares the belief that there are significant barriers to entry 
especially in the retail segment. He however forecasts lower profits in the future. The 
success of the individual firms will depend on how successful their business models 
are. If it is successful there is also no need to change anything. However he also 
mentions the fact that most of these firms run on different strategies, and therefore 
their results will also vary. Although he currently sees no equity problems in the 
industry, additional difficulties in the markets that cause a deterioration of the credit 
portfolio might make international partners a welcome source of capital.  
 
11. Do you see an opportunity to enlarge your market position in the region 
during the next five years? 
 
Mr. Smith thinks that it is possible that an M&A wave might happen due to the crisis. 
However he believes that it will still be difficult for outsiders to enter the market, due 
to the large market shares of the current players. Another reason why expanding 
their operations might become difficult, is that the competitors that bought firms on 
the market during the booming period, bought at high prices. Due to this they are 
currently not able to sell off these subsidiaries at a profit. This also to a certain 
degree is a reason for the enormous demand for equity. All market members want to 
be well capitalized in order to be able to use good acquisition possibilities, but these 
might come at a price. 
 
Mr. Jones believes that in the current situation growth in market share is only 
relatively important. It is much more important to connect with the current customers, 
and sell them more products. He believes that this will create more profitable 
customers, and that their risk will be easier to determine. One possible source of 
growth for Raiffeisen International is the close cooperation with Uniqa. Through their 
bancassurance agreement, Raiffeisen is also able to profit from the underdeveloped 
insurance market in Eastern Europe.  
 
The VIG representative once again mentioned that this is different in every country of 
the region. In some countries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia the group is not 
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able to expand anymore, since it is already at the border of the EU competitive 
market regulation. Even though VIG would definitely be interested in good takeover 
opportunities, in some countries like Rumania and Bulgaria there are currently no 
real acquisition opportunities. In other words Mr. Brooks does not necessarily believe 
in an M&A wave due to the crisis. The goal of the group will be to grow organically 
rather than through acquisitions. 
 
Mr. Terry sees a general trend during the next three to five years towards organic 
growth. He believes that this way the companies can also realize growth in market 
share, since market shares in these emerging markets are not frozen like in Western 
developed economies. He also mentions that even if Uniqa was looking for 
acquisition possibilities, there are currently no realistic ones on the market. People 
are still expecting high prices, even though the foreign buyers are only willing to buy 
at low ones. Additionally there is the factor that due to the new high equity 
requirements, investors have become more careful with acquisitions. 
 
12. Concerning the new requirements that have to be met by banks and 
insurers (Basel 2/Solvency 2) do you see more local or Europe-wide 
regulation due to the crisis? 
 
Mr. Smith thinks that it would be better to have European guidelines, but currently 
this seems highly unlikely. There are a large number of national guidelines that just 
got put into place, and therefore it is going to be hard to make a set of rules that 
guides the entire region. However Mr. Smith thinks that this crisis should also be 
seen as an opportunity to reform the regulatory system, in order to improve it for 
future crises. 
 
Mr. Jones has a similar point of view to the Bank Austria representative. He thinks 
that European wide regulations would be better for the system, and would save a lot 
of costs. Considering that the individual national banks would have to give up some 
of their rights this currently seems very unlikely.  
 
Mr. Brooks believes that the Austrian system is already very good, and that there are 
too many things still unclear with Solvency 2. He believes that it would be important 
to take the situation of each insurer into consideration. One fact that specifically 
worries him is that the definition of equity capital still is unclear. It also is still unknown 
90 
whether, or to what degree, hybrid capital can be considered as equity. Another 
factor is whether the group as a whole has to meet the equity requirements or each 
subsidiary by itself. He states that in general the equity requirements definitely should 
go up, but the regulators also have to keep the current situation in mind. If they put 
the equity requirements too high, they could do more harm than good. Mr. Brooks 
believes that the politicians and the IFRS board are lacking the understanding for the 
current situation of some companies. 
 
Mr. Terry sees a development towards more European regulation, which from his 
perspective is not bad if it would concern the coordination process. However he 
believes that if the EU tries to increase the equity requirements too much, this could 
cause a lot of problems for the development of the region, and pro-long a recovery. 
 
Mr. Charles sees a strong tendency towards a more European regulation with 
independent authorities. As an example he mentions the current discussions about a 
banking and insurance authority. He also mentions that it is important for the 
European regulators to act quickly, since some countries are only cooperative for a 
certain timeframe.  He sees this as an important step for the European financial 
system. In his eyes it is necessary to regulate on an international level when the 
market players are also acting and thinking on an international basis. The only 
problem that he sees is that such a system could probably not be created with the 
current EU constitution, and therefore it might take some time to develop. Currently 
there is a compromise, where the members of the regulating authority meet and 
discuss the issues with the corporations operating in their country. For this reason 
Mr. Charles believes that the current system should differentiate between regional 
and international banks, and that the execution should for now remain at a regional 
level.   
 
13. Do you believe that in the future there will be a general trend towards 
stricter regulation, or will this trend ease again once the current crisis is in 
the past? 
 
Mr. Smith believes that there is generally going to be stricter regulation beyond the 
crisis.  The core tier 1 ratio requirements for example are definitely going to be 
raised. From his point of view there is also no reason why that should change after 
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the crisis. However he again mentions that the important part for a bank is not to 
meet the requirements in absolute terms, but to have a relative advantage over the 
competition. 
 
Mr. Jones thinks that stricter regulation definitely makes sense, especially in the 
current situation. After all the system should learn from its history. However he 
believes that if this stricter regulation is brought about at the wrong time it might have 
a very negative effect. The worst thing that could happen would be that through this 
new regulation the growth is slowed down, and that the recovery would therefore 
take longer. He also mentions that currently there are big discussions about how to 
change the system, and that not everything turns out as presented by the media. 
 
Mr. Brooks says that there is definitely a trend towards stricter regulation. However 
he does not believe that it is going to be as strict as often stated from the press. 
Nevertheless this stricter regulation will also remain after the crisis. Warning systems, 
as for example stress tests will become more important, since the goal must be to 
prevent such an event. 
 
The interview partner from Uniqa said that the regulators are still acting in a state of 
shock, which was caused by the strong accusations from politicians. Now they are 
trying to avoid these situations in the future via large capital requirements. 
Unfortunately this also causes several problems. For example the foreign investment 
is becoming lower, and this is necessary for the growth of the region. If these strict 
capital requirements are put into place, they also most likely are going to stay, which 
makes it even more important to formulate them exactly. From his perspective this 
over-regulated environment is going to have negative effects on the business over 
the next decade. Due to the fact this entire situation is highly influenced by populist 
political statements, the trend will also not be easily reversed. 
 
Mr. Charles states that most certainly if stricter regulations are put into place they will 
also remain there. Another factor that definitely hints towards stricter regulation that 
will also remain after the crisis, are the beliefs of the G-20 members. They agreed 
that in the future there will be stricter regulations for the financial systems. However 
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they also said that they do not necessarily want to cause an over-regulated 
environment, but rather a better system.  
 
14. Do you think that the European regulatory system has to be reformed in 
order to create a “unified codex” which applies to all market players, and do 
you think that future crisis scenarios can be prevented this way? 
 
Mr. Smith thinks that there will always be a future crisis even though this one has 
definitely been above average. He believes that this crisis is an opportunity for the 
regulators to improve the system. The regulatory system should be conducted 
centrally in order to recognize risks earlier. This would not prevent a crisis from 
happening, but it could deal better with the consequences. If the crisis had not 
happened, there would have also been no incentive to improve the system, which 
could have later on resulted in even bigger problems. 
 
Mr. Jones definitely sees himself on the pro side of this argument. A new regulation 
with the same set of rules for everyone would save a lot of money. Unfortunately 
most national banks believe that it is better to regulate locally, and that their 
competence to judge the economic situation of their country is better than of a 
European authority. For this reason he believes that even though it is a great idea, 
such a European authority will lack the necessary competences to actually make a 
difference. 
 
According to the VIG representative this has already become more than necessary. It 
would be important to form European criteria and guidelines that have to be followed 
by the companies. For instance the regulators at the headquarters of a company 
should play an important role, and also an assisting role in all countries where the 
company has subsidiaries. However he also mentions that new regulation alone 
cannot prevent another crisis from happening. Through new criteria and rules 
companies can be made more stable in shock situations, but trying to do more than 
that would be counterproductive. Rather than tightening the standards for firms even 
more, a European rating agency should be created. This way there would finally be 
the possibility to receive ratings from experts that actually understand the region. 
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Mr. Terry believes that a unified regulation, especially for the coordination process, 
would be something good. However if the EU simply tries to take responsibilities from 
the local national banks and move them to Brussels or another financial center, this 
will not be successful. They should focus on the coordination process. In the U.S. for 
example the authorities are also not all unified. Mr. Terry believes that making the 
entire process to strict would result in a disadvantage in terms of flexibility for Europe.  
 
Mr. Charles thinks that a united European regulatory system would definitely benefit 
the market. One thing it would definitely do is reducing the regulatory arbitrage. The 
only problem is that such steps have to be coordinated globally, because otherwise 
the EU would have a disadvantage to other financial centers. 
5.2 – Results 
Question 1: 
Both Banking representatives share the view that the region is completely 
heterogeneous, and therefore the problems lie in different areas for each country. 
Unfortunately they also forecast another downturn. 
 
The insurance representatives believe that the recovery process in the region will be 
quicker than in Western Europe. However they mention that this varies from country 
to country. The interview partner from Uniqa specifically mentions that the amount of 
foreign investment is critical for the development of the region. 
 
The national bank representative similarly to all other interview partners believes that 
the region is not homogeneous. There are large differences in the development of 
the individual countries, but Eastern Europe will remain the growth source of the 
European continent.  
 
Question 2: 
Both interview partners from the banking industry believe that there is still enormous 
catch up potential in Eastern Europe, and that the region will also play a large role in 
the future. However both of them mention that the industry has most certainly faced 
difficulties due to the economic crisis, especially following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.  
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The interview partners from the insurance side believe that the large volatility on the 
markets is caused by the behavior of speculators. These nowadays tend to move 
more rapidly due to messages of the media. The VIG representative additionally 
mentions that the crisis originated in the west and then moved eastwards, and not 
the other way around.  
 
The national bank representative believes that the Austrian financial institutions are 
highly diversified, and therefore in a relatively safe position according to theory. 
 
Question 3: 
All interview partners for this question shared the same belief. They see large catch 
up potential in the entire region, but the situation varies for each country and is 
dependent on the amount of foreign investment. 
 
Question 4: 
All interview partners share the belief that the countries surrounding Austria are the 
furthest along, specifically the Czech Republic. However they also mention that there 
still is a significant gap to western levels, and therefore not even these economies 
can be considered developed markets. 
 
Question 5: 
Both banking representatives agree that there are problems in all product segments, 
but foreign currency loans have so far been the biggest issue. Another factor 
mentioned by the Bank Austria representative is that the Euro despite seeming like a 
save have against currency volatility should not be used as such, since it would risk 
the stability of all other Euro countries.  
 
Both interview partners from the insurance side similarly see problems in all product 
segments, but both agree that the life insurance side has been more affected. Both 
also believe that the situation is dependent on the country. The Uniqa representative 
additionally mentions that countries under restrictions by the IMF will take longer to 
recover due to stricter regulation. 
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The national bank representative sees the biggest issue in political instability. He 
believes that an unstable government, or populist statements by politicians can have 
a big effect on the future development of the country. Despite that he sees Austrian 
financial institutions to be safe, since most of their operations are in EU countries. 
 
Question 6: 
Both banking representatives believe that currently the capitalization is not a problem 
for the Austrian institutions. They also believe that the core tier 1 ratio will be raised 
due to the financial crisis, but they have different thoughts on how much. While the 
Bank Austria representative believes that it will have to be around 9%, the Raiffeisen 
International representative believes that it will be between 6-7%. 
 
The interview partners from VIG and Uniqa both believe that currently there are no 
issues for Austrian insurers concerning the solvency ratio, but Solvency 2 might be 
problematic. They both believe that it is largely influenced by large multi national 
insurers, and therefore will be difficult for others to fulfill.  
 
The national bank representative thinks that it is most important to differentiate 
between the regulatory and the market requirements, since these often play a larger 
role for banks. 
 
Question 7: 
 All interview partners believe that the equity requirements will rise, and that this will 
also remain after the crisis. However it is still unclear how the new regulation will 
look, and therefore the interview partners mentioned that it is important to create a 
global set of rules that applies to everyone and does not only consider the interests 
of a few.  One interesting fact mentioned by the Uniqa representative is that he does 
not see where all the additional capital should come from with a relatively small 
equity market in continental Europe. 
 
Question 8: 
While the Bank Austria, the VIG and the Austrian National Bank representative 
believe that the current help packages should be enough, the Raiffeisen International 
and the Uniqa representative still see difficult times in the future. Despite the fact that 
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they have different believes concerning the necessity of a new help-package, they all 
believe that there are more than enough funds to conduct such a package if it 
becomes necessary. The Raiffeisen International and the Uniqa representative 
however also believe that such additional help packages will also cause additional 
regulation, which will hinder the growth opportunities of these countries. 
 
Question 9: 
Cost cutting plays a similar role amongst all interview partners. All companies are 
currently running cost cutting programs that specifically focus on the efficiency of 
back office processes. Despite the fact that all are trying to improve the performance 
through cost cutting, none of them believe that this is going to affect the flexibility of 
their companies. 
 
Question 10: 
All interview partners believe that the market position of the Austrian financial service 
industry in the region is going to remain the way it is throughout the crisis. They 
believe that there are significant barriers to entry in these markets and therefore they 
see their market position as relatively safe. The only option for an external player to 
enter the market according to the Uniqa representative is to take a stake in an 
Austrian holding company, since an entry in the Eastern European markets seems 
close to impossible. 
 
Question 11: 
The interview partners all shared the thought that the future goal will be to grow 
organically rather than through acquisitions. However this is not the case because 
the companies are not interested in acquiring competitors as the VIG representative 
mentioned. He states that currently there are basically no opportunities on the 
market, since most of the potential sellers bought shortly before the crisis. For this 
reason the price expectations are still too high, but if that factor changes it might 
trigger an M&A wave in the region. 
 
Question 12: 
All interview partners share the belief that there is a trend towards European 
guidelines, which is a good development if implemented correctly. However they also 
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believe that such developments are very difficult on a European level, because all 
individual countries have their own interests and that will ultimately slow down the 
process according to the banking industry representatives. The interview partners 
from the insurance side see different problems due to the new regulation. They 
believe that an over-regulated environment as it is currently planned, will in the 
medium to long run do more harm than good. The national bank representative 
additionally is worried that if the EU does not act quickly on the reformation of the 
regulatory system the window of opportunity might close due to a recovery.  
 
Question 13: 
All interview partners believe that there will be stricter regulation due to the crisis, and 
that once it is in place it will also remain. However they also believe that the timing for 
this reformation process is critical. It could possibly have a severe effect on the 
growth opportunities of the region, and thereby prolong a recovery. 
 
Question 14: 
All interview partners favor a new European regulatory system. They believe that 
after a crisis like the current one, a reformation of the regulatory system is a logical 
step. However they also believe that it currently seems unlikely. The power of local 
national banks is still very high, and these will probably block any progress that might 
change this. Additionally they also mention that additional restrictions to the financial 
markets can only be done globally, since otherwise it would cause a comparative 
disadvantage for the EU. They believe that an adaption of the old system is 
necessary, since it has proven to be inefficient. However an over-reaction of the 
regulators from their perspective might be problematic. On the one hand it could 
cause a disadvantage for the entire EU in comparison to other financial centers. On 
the other hand they also believe that new crises will always happen and cannot be 
prevented. The only thing that should be done is to make the individual companies 
more stable in critical situations.  
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6 – Conclusion and Outlook 
The following section will at first provide answers to the research questions followed 
by a test of the hypotheses stated in Chapter 1. The conclusions where drawn from 
the information provided by the interview partners during the empirical analysis. This 
will provide the reader with an overview of the current situation of the Austrian 
financial institutions as well as an outlook according to the views of managing 
directors in the individual firms. 
 
The research questions where the following: 
• What influence will the large involvement in the Eastern European market 
have on the Austrian financial institutions? 
According to the answers provided by the interview partners the Austrian financial 
service industry should not have difficulties in the region due to the effects of the 
financial crisis. Actually the broad diversification of the Austrian banks and insurance 
companies throughout the region provide them with additional stability if a shock 
where to occur in one of the countries. All of them shared the perspective that the 
crisis originated in the West, and that the media miss this fact a lot of the time. The 
region has of course felt the consequences of the financial crisis, but it is still not in 
such a bad condition. Another important factor that stood out during the interviews is 
that the region is heterogeneous. For this reason the region in total is unproblematic, 
but while some countries like the Czech Republic, which is considered to be the 
furthest along in their development, are well off others like Hungary are facing 
enormous difficulties. Nevertheless the recovery throughout the region should start 
earlier and at a higher pace than in the Western world. Due to the enormous catch up 
potential it will therefore reach pre-crisis levels quicker. However none of them 
believe that the crisis is already over. There is still a lot of factors that can severely 
harm the future economic development of the region, as for instance political 
instability and over-regulation. For this reason the interview partners are also split up 
on whether there will be an additional wave of rescue packages. Fortunately all of 
them are certain that the funds for such actions would be available, whether they are 
necessary or not. 
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• How will their Equity have to adapt due to the crisis? 
A general increase in equity requirements that will also remain after the crisis is to be 
expected by the entire financial service industry. For banks the core tier 1 capital 
ratio is going to be the biggest concern. The interview partners expect it to rise to 
somewhere between 6.5-9%. Another question is how much equity will be necessary 
to operate in which segment. A lot of factors currently remain unclear, since the 
reformation of the regulation is only at the start. This is even more the case in the 
insurance industry. Both of the interview partners stated that they were still very 
uncertain on what effect the new regulation will have on their business. Despite all of 
these uncertainties in the regulation, all of the interview partners including the 
Austrian National Bank representative believe that it is most important to look at the 
equity levels in comparison to the competition. On the current volatile and extremely 
sensitive markets it is important to remain at a relatively higher equity level than the 
competitors in order to keep a comparative advantage.  
 
• How influential are cost-cutting programs going to be on development and 
flexibility? 
Despite the fact that cost-cutting programs are the headlines of most newspapers, 
they will most likely not have a lot of influence on the development of the reviewed 
companies. All of them have programs running that are mostly focused on reducing 
back-office costs, but all interview partners stated that this will have little influence on 
the opportunities undertaken by the institutes. Increasing efficiency will however 
remain at the top of the agenda, specifically concerning the fact that the new 
regulation might make it difficult to perform in the current situation. 
 
• How will the strong market position of the Austrian financial institutions 
develop? 
All of the interview partners believe that they are going to remain in their current 
market positions if not expand them. They believe that the Austrian banks and 
insurance companies operating in the region entered the market early enough to get 
a substantial market share. Through this development, which already began before 
the fall of the iron curtain, significant barriers to entry where created. Due to these 
barriers all interview partners including the national bank representative believe that 
the market position will remain untouched throughout the crisis. Due to their large 
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market shares they might even be able to grow despite the fact that there are 
currently almost no acquisition possibilities on the market. Since market shares tend 
to show more movement in emerging markets than in developed economies, a 
growth in market share can also be caused by organic growth, which will most likely 
be the main goal for most institutes operating in the region. 
 
• What role will financial regulation play in the future? 
The adaptations in regulation are most likely going to have the largest influence on 
the future development of the Austrian financial service industry. All interview 
partners see the financial crisis as a window of opportunity for the regulators, but 
these would have to act quickly. The individual national banks are only going to be 
willing to pass part of their power to a European authority when times are bad. Once 
the recovery starts they will most likely start to focus on their individual interests 
again. A step towards a European set of regulations would be positive but only if 
implemented correctly, and this is where most of the interview partners see the 
problem. The interview partners from the insurance side showed special concern 
about the new regulation (Solvency 2), since they think that it is strongly biased 
towards the interests of a few large multi-national insurers. If that is the case they feel 
that an adaption in the regulation might not be a good step. Nevertheless both the 
banking and the insurance side think that the financial world will have to learn a 
lesson from the current crisis. The only question that remains is at what point. 
According to them the timing of this process is crucial to the future development of 
the region. They believe that an over-regulated environment will possibly harm 
growth opportunities, and in the end the new guidelines could therefore do more 
harm than good without good timing. Overall they believe that it is time for 
adaptations in this area, but due to the already mentioned issues it seems unlikely.  
On the one hand there are powerful national banks that follow the goals of their 
country, and on the other such switches in regulation would have to be done globally. 
Otherwise it could cause a severe disadvantage for the EU in comparison to the 
United States and Asia. After all none of them believe that future crises can be 
prevented by stricter regulation and that should also not be the goal of the regulators. 
New and stricter regulation in its best form can make companies more stable, but 
trying to prevent a future crisis through this method would harm economic growth 
severely.  
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These research questions led to the following hypotheses: 
H1: The large involvement of Austrian financial institutions in the Eastern European 
market bears substantial risks for the Austrian banking and insurance industry. 
As one can tell from the answer of the first research question, there is not one 
interview partner that shared the beliefs of some correspondents of the international 
press. They all see the Austrian financial service industry as being highly diversified 
in a very heterogeneous region, and therefore hypothesis 1 is proven to be false. 
 
H2: The countries of the region have enormous differences and therefore cannot be 
considered a homogeneous region. 
While the media was considering the risk of the entire region, all of the interview 
partners considered the problems of the individual countries. According to them it 
makes an enormous in which one of the reviewed countries a bank or insurance is 
operating in. There is also considerable difference between the banking and 
insurance industry, which is often combined by the press as the financial service 
sector. For instance while the Ukraine is currently a difficult country for banks the 
insurance density still is at a very low level, and therefore makes it less problematic 
in their portfolio. Due to the enormous differences between the countries and the 
sectors of the financial service industry this hypothesis has proven to be true. 
 
H3: The institutions will have trouble coming up with the necessary equity that will be 
demanded by the regulators, and therefore their room for expansion will be minimal. 
This hypothesis showed different results for many of the interview partners. Some 
believed that their current equity ratios will be sufficient to deal with any problems still 
ahead, while others believed that these will still have to be increased. Due to this 
difference in the judgment of the capital situation of Austrian financial institutions 
there was also a difference in the believes on whether the capital resources on the 
European market will be able to match the increased demand due to new regulation. 
The uncertainties considering the new financial regulation where a specific issue for 
the judgment of the situation. Due to these uncertainties the hypothesis has only 
proven to be partially true. Additionally it seems as if the limited possibilities in the 
expansion process are caused by the lack of reasonable acquisition possibilities on 
the market. 
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H4: The current market position of Austrian financial institutions in the region will 
remain after the crisis. 
All interview partners gave similar answers to the questions asked about this area. All 
of them believe that the Austrian financial service industry will remain at its leading 
position in the region. Parts of the reason are large barriers to entry that were built up 
after their early entry into the markets of the region. Due to their dominant position it 
is close to impossible for newcomers to successfully enter the market and gain 
significant market share. For this reason this hypothesis has proven to be true. 
 
H5: Regulation will become a lot stricter and have a negative influence on growth. 
All interview partners share the thought that the financial regulation is going to 
become stricter due to the financial crisis. The banking side of the interview partners 
believes that their capital should be sufficient to meet any new regulation, while the 
insurance side sees difficulties with the new system. The negative outlook on growth 
due to the stricter regulation is however only confirmed by the insurance side of the 
interview partners, while the banking side still sees sufficient growth in the future. 
However there is still large uncertainty on how the system is effectively going to 
change. Many definitions still remain unclear, which makes it hard for the managers 
of these corporations to forecast the future development. The most important factor 
however came from the national bank representative. He pointed out that the system 
is only going to change significantly if the regulators use the window of opportunity. 
Therefore due to the large uncertainties considering the development of the 
regulation this hypothesis can only be considered partially true. 
 
The outlook in terms of growth for the region seems relatively stable. Some countries 
are going to witness problems, while others recover faster. From the countries under 
review by this thesis the Ukraine and Hungary have proven to be most problematic. 
However their problems stem from different reasons than the financial crisis. The 
public indebtedness of Hungary already was an issue prior to fall 2008 and just got 
intensified through the liquidity crisis. The problems in the Ukraine mostly stem from 
the political instability. Without a clear direction from the government it becomes 
severely difficult for an economy to recover from a crisis. Fortunately for these two 
economies they where rescued by the IMF. Due to the membership in the European 
Union the situation was not as difficult for Hungary as it was for the Ukraine. However 
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both of them will have to follow the strict rules set up by these institutions. If they do 
not comply the financial aid process is stopped, and therefore their flexibility in policy 
will be limited in the future. 
 
The Austrian banks and insurance companies under review by this thesis have so far 
not shown big problems. Most certainly their profit margins declined, but in contrast 
to the common belief presented by the media they did not come close to a collapse. 
They felt the effects of the financial crisis, specifically following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, but due to their diversified portfolio throughout the region their 
business has remained relatively stable.  
 
The reason why the general outlook on the banking and insurance sector can be 
regarded as slightly negative is the uncertainty that lies in the new regulation. At the 
moment nobody is 100% certain on how the new regulations (Basel 2 and Solvency 
2) are going to affect their business. The definition of equity itself is one of the most 
problematic issues. The classification of equity classes as for instance to what extent 
hybrid capital can be accounted as such makes an enormous difference on the future 
opportunities of the industry. Some areas of business might become extinct due to 
the new regulation, but none are going to remain untouched. The interview partner 
from Bank Austria for instance mentioned that he believes that banks will probably 
not be able to trade on their own books in the future, which would ultimately change 
the current business model. Additionally new taxes are to be expected either on a 
European wide or individual country basis. All together it draws a grim picture on the 
growth possibilities of the industry. The question that causes the most uncertainty is 
whether the new regulation will throw the European continent or the Eastern 
European region back into a recession, or as a matter of fact whether such new 
regulation will actually be effective. The national bank representative was specifically 
worried that new regulation has to be implemented fast in order for it to be effective. 
The focus on their own interests of the individual national banks will return once the 
recession eases, and therefore a change in the regulatory system will become very 
difficult.  
 
In total the future development of the Austrian banks and insurance companies will 
not be as much dependent on the development of the countries under review, but 
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rather on the development of the financial regulation. Due to the diversified portfolio 
of the companies, difficulties in some countries are balanced out by outperformance 
in others. European regulation on the other hand cannot be avoided as easily. 
Stricter regulation might cause restructuring in some firms, while others are going to 
remain relatively unchanged. However it is going to play a key role on the 
development of the financial service industry globally. Austrian banks and insurance 
companies therefore will have to adapt their current business models to the new 
regulation, which might cause difficulties and limit the room for an expansion 
process, but if this is done successfully the future of the industry should remain a 
success story. 
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7 – Executive Summary 
The Austrian financial service industry due to the financial crisis has often been 
projected to be at risk by the media. Especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in the fall of 2008 the entire banking world faced the biggest liquidity crisis in its 
history. It was also at this point that the financial crisis swept over to Eastern Europe. 
At that time all Austrian banks and insurance companies where projected to be highly 
risky due to their exposure in these Eastern European markets. The reasoning 
behind that implication was often vague and directed at the entire Eastern European 
region rather than focusing on the problems of individual countries. This thesis is 
therefore supposed to show a more differentiated view of the risks and opportunities 
that the Austrian banks and insurance companies are currently facing in Eastern 
Europe due to the financial crisis.  
 
The countries under review by this thesis are the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary in the Central Eastern Europe (CEE) region; Bulgaria and Romania in the 
Southeastern European region, and the Ukraine as part of the Conglomerate of 
Independent States (CIS). This selection to a certain extent also represents the 
historic development of the Austrian financial service industry. The companies 
started expanding to the countries bordering Austria, and then the corporations 
started to move further into the SEE and CIS regions.  The first focus of the thesis is 
on the financial stability of the individual countries under review. The picture received 
was far more differentiated than often projected by the media. While some countries 
like the Czech Republic only started to feel the effects of the crisis, others like 
Hungary and the Ukraine came to the brink of collapse.  However the countries that 
felt the effects of the crisis more than others already had problems before hand. Prior 
to the collapse of Lehman brothers Hungary for instance was facing large problems 
concerning their external debt and their lack of GDP growth during the booming 
period between 2003 and 2008.  Fortunately for them they were saved by the IMF, 
which granted a twenty billion Euro credit line and thereby secured the liquidity on the 
market. Another factor that helped Hungary and almost all other countries under 
review by this thesis was the large dedication of the parent companies towards their 
subsidiaries. Specifically Austrian institutions have shown that they want to keep 
Eastern Europe as their home market, and that they are not planning on retrieving 
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due to the current difficulties. One problem that Hungary shares with many countries 
of the region is the currency risk. The currencies of emerging markets have shown to 
be even more volatile during a crisis, and therefore have caused difficulties for the 
banks and insurance companies operating in them. The only country that has 
basically avoided this problem was Slovakia, which entered the Euro area in the 
beginning of 2009.  
 
Another negative factor that arose due to the volatility in the currency markets where 
foreign currency loans. This specifically became a problem concerning loans 
denominated in Swiss Franks in Hungary and several other countries across the 
region. Unfortunately this product was largely offered by Austrian banks, and 
therefore they now have to carry the burden of a product that once was a cash cow 
and now became illegal. Overall the development on the currency markets also led to 
an adaptation in the business model. While during the booming years they would 
finance the growth in loans by any means, they will now focus on financing it through 
local deposits. Deposits in general will play a more dominant role in the future of the 
banking industry.   
 
The markets across the region as already mentioned have mixed tendencies. The 
problems mentioned above are more dominant in some countries while others have 
not started to feel the effects of the crisis yet. For instance the banking sector in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia has not been as severely hit by the financial turmoil. In 
these economies the industry was still showing positive results. Off course they 
started to feel the pressure considering their portfolio quality, but overall the effects of 
the crisis will most likely not be as severe as in other countries. The insurance 
industry on the other hand is currently facing more difficult times due to their 
deterioration in the value of financial assets. In the selected markets their results 
where always largely influenced by the turmoil on the financial markets, while their 
core business was still doing relatively well due to the convergence process in the 
region. However it has to be mentioned that none of the Austrian insurance 
companies have so far applied for financial help from the state. 
 
The companies under review where both the largest Austrian banks and insurance 
companies. The banks selected where: UniCredit Bank Austria, Raiffeisen 
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International and Erste Bank. The insurance companies selected where Vienna 
Insurance Group (VIG), and Uniqa. These firms where chosen, since they are both 
dominant players on the Austrian as well as the Eastern European market.  
 
Bank Austria was the biggest bank under review, and is currently acting as the sub-
holding company of UniCredit, one of the biggest banks in Europe. Despite the crisis 
they showed a large increase in profits for the holding company and each one of the 
subsidiaries under review. They see the financial turmoil as a possibility to 
restructure and thereby become more efficient. Bank Austria is managing five of the 
six countries under review (ex Ukraine), and has similar aims in all its subsidiaries. 
One focus is on keeping the loan to deposit ratio as low as possible preferably 
financing loan growth through new deposits. The other focus is on the profitability 
and efficiency of the subsidiaries.  
 
Raiffeisen International is the subsidiary of Raiffeisen Zentral Bank responsible for 
the operations in Eastern Europe. As of 2008 they were the second biggest Austrian 
bank in the region. Since their start the bank was following an aggressive growth 
path. This business model however had to be adapted due to the effects of the crisis. 
Now the focus lies on increasing deposits to finance loan growth in the subsidiaries, 
whereas prior to the crisis the focus was on growing as much as possible. Despite 
the change in business model they still showed a record braking profit in 2008. 
However the profit could have been even higher without currency devaluations. The 
subsidiaries under review, with the exception of some country specific issues, did 
relatively well despite the difficulties on the financial markets. Except for Romania 
and the Ukraine they all managed to decrease their loan to deposit ratio, while also 
increasing the efficiency in most subsidiaries.  
 
Erste Bank is the third biggest Austrian bank operating in the region, but runs under a 
different business model than the other two banks under review. Their focus always 
was on the retail segment in order to be able to offer a broad portfolio to a wide 
audience. They also limited their regional focus to the EU region, which provides 
them with additional stability in difficult times. Their strategy has so far proven to be 
successful, which is indicated by the increase in operating profit. However this profit 
similar to the other institutions under review was negatively influenced by the 
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financial result. They are currently operating in five out of the six countries under 
review, and with the exception of the Ukraine, which represents a start-up operation; 
all of them have already reached a significant market share. Their focus is to 
increase deposits and the efficiency while remaining in the leading position on the 
market.  
 
Vienna Insurance Group as Austria’s biggest insurer also takes an important position 
on the Eastern European market. They are operating in all countries under review, 
while taking a Top 3 position in five out of the six markets. Despite the crisis they 
managed to increase their total premiums. This was to a large extent caused by the 
growth in Eastern Europe, which already provides approximately half of the total 
premiums earned. Their focus in Eastern Europe has been on motor-vehicle 
insurance, which has proven to be successful in times of a crisis, since people are 
mostly not willing to give up their mobility. The region still has a very low insurance 
density, and therefore despite the difficulties there are still a lot of growth 
opportunities for VIG. Due to the financial crisis the profitability of the subsidiaries 
under review during 2008 was not exceptional. Only the subsidiaries in Romania and 
the Czech Republic showed increases in profits, while others had more difficulty to 
remain profitable.  
 
Uniqa is Austria’s second biggest insurance company, and has also taken a 
dominant role in the Eastern European market. Their Eastern European subsidiaries 
contributed to the increase in premiums despite the difficult times, and as of 2008 
was already responsible for 22% of the total premiums generated. Their goal is to 
further increase this ratio in the future, so that at some point the Eastern European 
subsidiaries contribute more than half of the total premiums. Due to the difficulties on 
the financial markets, which had a severe effect on the value of their assets, their 
profit on ordinary activities was only one third of the previous value.  
 
In order to be able to test the stated hypotheses four interviews with managers of the 
Austrian financial service industry where conducted. Two interview partners where 
from the banking sector (UniCredit Bank Austria, Raiffeisen International), and two 
interview partners came from the insurance sector (VIG, Uniqa). The interviews 
where conducted according to a questionnaire that covered five different areas of 
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interest (Region, Equity, Cost, Market Position, Regulation) that could possibly affect 
the future of these companies. In order to provide a point of view that was not biased 
towards the private sector an additional interview with a representative from the 
Austrian national bank was conducted to provide the point of view of the regulators. 
 
According to the answers provided during the interview process, the individual 
representatives believe that the future of the Austrian financial service industry still is 
going to be very bright despite the effects of the crisis. Most certainly the companies 
under review felt the consequences of the liquidity crisis in fall of 2008, but they have 
managed to adapt their business models where necessary, and have remained 
profitable up till this day. Their first mover advantage in this region has put them into 
strong market positions across the region, which ultimately created large barriers to 
entry for other contenders.  
 
All interview partners agreed that the regulators currently have the biggest influence 
on the future of the entire industry. It is up to them to reform the failed system 
successfully. However they should keep in mind that over-regulation, which reduces 
growth, should not be the ultimate goal. In the end all interview partners agreed that 
a future crisis cannot, or to a certain extent should not be prevented by a regulatory 
system. The goal of the new system should be to make corporations more stable in 
times of a crisis rather than hinder growth through over-regulation. However another 
factor that the interview partners agreed upon was that such a new system would 
have to be put in place quickly in order to be successful, and that unfortunately 
seems to be the catch. Whether or not the individual national banks will give up some 
of their rights to a European authority is questionable, and the implementation of 
such a system seems even more problematic. 
 
In total the future development of the Austrian banks and insurance companies will 
not be as much dependent on the development of the countries under review, but 
rather on the development of the financial regulation. This will ultimately affect the 
entire financial world around the globe. Austrian banks and insurance companies 
therefore will have to adapt their current business models to the new regulation, 
which might cause difficulties and limit the room for an expansion process, but if this 
is done successfully their future should remain bright. 
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9 – Abstrakt 
Die österreichische Finanzindustrie war während der Finanzkrise oft im Fokus der 
Medien. Speziell in der Liquiditätskrise nach der Lehman Brothers Pleite im Herbst 
2008 wurde das einstige Osteuropapotential der Finanzdienstleister plötzlich als 
enorme Risikoquelle dargestellt. Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit hat es sich zur 
Aufgabe gemacht die Risiken und Möglichkeiten der österreichischen Banken und 
Versicherungen in ausgewählten Ländern der Region Ost- und Südosteuropa auf 
Grund der Finanzkrise näher zu analysieren. Es wurden Hypothesen über die 
Entwicklung verschiedener Bereiche (Region, Eigenkapital, Kosten, Marktposition, 
Regulierung) erstellt, die nach einer ausführlichen Umweltanalyse durch einen 
Interviewprozess getestet wurden.  
 
Die ausgewählten Länder (Tschechien, Slowakei, Ungarn, Bulgarien, Rumänien, 
Ukraine) sind sowohl repräsentativ für die einzelnen Subregionen (Zentraleuropa, 
Südosteuropa, CIS) als auch für die historische Entwicklung der heimischen Banken 
und Versicherungen. Die ersten Expansionsschritte wurden in unmittelbar 
angrenzenden Ländern getätigt, da hier auch ein historischer Zusammenhalt besteht, 
was einen erfolgreichen Markteintritt vereinfachte. Mit zunehmenden Erfolg 
expandierten die Unternehmen schließlich immer weiter und schneller Richtung 
Osten, was auch mit der Hauptgrund für den enormen internationalen Erfolg der 
österreichischen Finanzindustrie war. Aufgrund der Finanzkrise besteht nun 
allerdings die Frage, wie man sich von einer wachstumsorientierten Strategie zu 
einer Krisenstrategie entwickelt. 
 
Der erste Fokus der Arbeit liegt auf einer Analyse der Finanzstabilität der 
behandelten Länder. Die Informationen hierfür wurden vorwiegend von den 
Veröffentlichungen der individuellen Nationalbanken bezogen. Die Analyse zeigt auf, 
dass es sich um eine äußerst heterogene Region handelt, in der es eine große 
Anzahl verschiedener Risiken gibt. Die größten sind unter anderem eine hohe 
Staatsverschuldung, Währungsrisiken sowie eine abnehmende Höhe der 
Investitionen aus dem Ausland. Allerdings haben diese Risiken in den behandelten 
Ländern unterschiedliche Gewichtungen. Während einige Länder stark unter den 
Folgen der Krise leiden, wie zum Beispiel Ungarn, hielten sich manche Länder, wie 
Tschechien, während der größten Probleme wacker. Während sich die Slowakei 
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durch den Euro Beitritt im Januar 2009 keine Gedanken mehr über die 
Währungsstabilität machen muss, haben andere Länder der Region stark damit zu 
kämpfen.  
 
Die Arbeit behandelt sowohl die Aktivitäten der drei größten Österreichischen 
Banken (UniCredit Bank Austria, Raiffeisen International, Erste Bank) als auch der 
zwei größten Versicherer (Vienna Insurance Group, Uniqa). Diese Institute zählen 
sowohl zu den einflussreichsten Finanzdienstleistern in Österreich als auch in 
Zentral- und Osteuropa. Die Analyse der Unternehmen beinhaltet einen Überblick 
der unterschiedlichen Geschäftsmodelle, der momentanen finanziellen Lage und der 
Entwicklung der Länderportfolios. 
 
Um die anfangs aufgestellten Hypothesen zu testen wurden in Rahmen der 
Diplomarbeit fünf Interviews sowohl mit leitenden Mitarbeitern der jeweiligen 
Unternehmen, als auch eines Mitarbeiters der OeNB -um die Objektivität der Analyse 
zu bewahren- geführt. Daraus ergab sich eine für den Ernst der Lage relativ positive 
Sicht der Dinge. Sämtliche Interviewpartner befanden, dass die Region noch 
enormes Wachstumspotential sowohl auf Banken- als auch Versicherungsseite 
aufweist. Weiters wird sich die dominante Position der österreichischen 
Finanzdienstleister in der Region kaum in Folge der Wirtschaftskrise ändern, da in 
den behandelten Märkten bereits große Eintrittsbarrieren bestehen. Allerdings ist die 
Lage in der Region trotz dessen, dass die österreichischen Banken und 
Versicherungen grundsätzlich gut aufgestellt sind weiterhin mit Vorsicht zu 
beobachten. Die Lage bleibt auf Grund der labilen Weltwirtschaft weiter angespannt. 
 
Die Zukunft der österreichischen Finanzdienstleister wird eher von der Entwicklung 
der Regulierung abhängig sein, da die Unternehmen auf Grund der heterogenen 
Region ein gut diversifiziertes Portfolio besitzen. Durch eine striktere Regulierung 
könnte es zu großen Nachteilen für die Finanzdienstleister, kommen falls die Regeln 
nur innerhalb Europas zu einem standardisierten Markt führen. Laut den 
Interviewergebnissen kommt es vor allem darauf an, möglichst schnell ein gesundes 
Maß an Regulierung zu finden, um die Finanzmärkte in Krisensituationen stabiler zu 
machen ohne einen möglichen Aufschwung zu verhindern oder zu verlangsamen. 
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